The promising game

  • R. M. Hare
Part of the Controversies in Philosophy book series (COIPHIL)


One of the most fundamental questions about moral judgements is whether they, and other value-judgements, can be logically derived from statements of empirical fact. Like most important philosophical questions, this one has reached the stage at which its discussion is bound to proceed piecemeal, in terms of particular examples, arguments and counter-arguments. This article is intended as a contribution to one such controversy. In a recent article, ‘How to derive “ought” from “is”’,1 Professor J. R. Searle attempts a feat which many before him have thought to perform. His argument, though it seems to me unsound, is set out with such clarity and elegance as amply to repay examination.


Moral Judgement Institutional Fact Constitutive Rule Brute Fact Cricket Ball 
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Copyright information

© Macmillan Publishers Limited 1969

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. M. Hare
    • 1
  1. 1.University of OxfordUK

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