War and Downfall

Abstract

It has been indicated to how great an extent the Italians had been repelled by Fascism since it had become anti-Semitic and altogether a poor imitation of German National Socialism. The experience of the war in Ethiopia and the fighting in Spain had not made most Italians more bellicose. The more remarkable thing, however, about Mussolini’s Fascism in 1939 was rather Italy’s lack of armaments than her lack of fighting spirit. The Abyssinian and the Spanish campaigns had used up large stocks of military material, but things were much worse than they need have been because Fascism in practice had proved inefficient and, particularly in Ethiopia, corrupt, and no one cared to inform the Duce of the true state of things although he was often the Minister responsible. Only the Italian Navy, which impressed Hitler and his naval advisers in May 1938 as potentially useful to Germany, was in any condition to enter a war. People other than Mussolini knew this — the lack of military preparation was freely discussed. When Albania was seized it was an open secret that the operation went badly. If Fascism had reduced Italy to these straits what could justify it?