Abstract
The preceding chapters have suggested guidelines which we might expect to influence policy-makers. First, assuming that markets are competitive, free trade and non-interference in domestic markets is the best policy for a government to follow if it wishes to achieve the highest possible level of potential welfare, except in the special case of the optimum tariff for a large country (and then only in the absence of retaliation).
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© 1994 Bo Södersten and Geoffey Reed
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Södersten, B., Reed, G. (1994). The Political Economy of Protection. In: International Economics. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15030-4_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15030-4_15
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-76365-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-15030-4
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