Abstract
In the post-war period the Anglo-American Alliance has become the most intimate international relationship which the United States maintains, and it is also unmatched on the British side by anything comparable … It is the product of an essential similarity of views concerning the dangers inherent in a world situation threatened by a militantly aggressive ideology allied with the Soviet Union.1
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Notes and References
Paper: ‘The Policies Affecting the Anglo-American Alliance’ (redraft) from the US Embassy in London to BNA, State Department, 6 January 1961, Box 1236, RG 59, general records of the State Department, Central Decimal Files, 1960–1963, Folder 611.41/1-1361, National Archives.
Evidence of the ‘special relationship’ can be identified after its supposed decline in the 1960s. See John Dickie, ‘Special’ No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1994).
Conversation between Sir Nicholas Henderson and the author.
Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1979), p. 90.
Hutchinson Dictionary of Scientists (Helicon Publishers: Oxford, 1996), p. 210.
The fact that the fission process had been discovered in Germany by Otto Hahn in December 1938 prompted British intelligence fears that Germany might take the lead in this field. See Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 14.
American scientists had been concentrating on atomic fission as a source of energy.
The British government feared that nuclear secrets might find their way to Germany via the United States which was not at war at this time.
The British radar programme exacted increasingly heavy demands on finances while German advances made security an issue in Britain that had to be taken seriously.
Margaret Gowing, Nuclear Weapons and the Special Relationship, in W. M. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds.), The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1989), pp. 118–19.
Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 15.
Botti, The Long Wait, pp. 22–3.
Secret wartime Quebec and Hyde Park agreements guaranteeing cooperation and consultation which might have had some bearing on the legislation had apparantly been ‘lost’ in the United States. Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–45 (Macmillan: London, 1964), p. 447.
McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (Schwartz & Wilkinson: Melbourne, 1990), p. 463.
Rosecrance and Dawson, ‘Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance’ (World Politics, October 1966), pp. 24–5. In return, Britain gave up the right, secured under the Quebec Agreement, to be consulted by the United States before the latter decided to use her nuclear arsenal.
Harold Watkinson, Turning Points: A Record of Our Times (Michael Russell: Salisbury, 1986), pp. 144–5.
According to Sir Nicholas Henderson, this defence relationship was ‘crucial’ to Britain. Conversation with the author.
S. J. Ball, ‘Military Nuclear Relations Between the United States and Great Britain under the Terms of the McMahon Act, 1946–1958’ (The Historical Journal, 38, 2 (1995), p. 441.
J. Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939–1980: The Special Relationship (Macmillan: London, 1984), p. 35.
Peter Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent (Croom Helm: London, 1984), p. 8.
John Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p. 236.
John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The US, Britain and the Military Atom (Macmillan: London, 1983), pp. 113–14.
Agreement for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information for Mutual Defence Purposes, cmd. 9555; Agreement for Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, cmd. 9560.
According to Ball, the United States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) attempted to block this transfer of atomic information and weapons. This was ignored by the US military who had an informal agreement with their British colleagues rather than a formal inter-governmental agreement. See Ball, Military Nuclear Relations, p. 450.
Malone, The British Nuclear Deterrent, p. 74.
Macmillan was Eden’s Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time of the crisis. He had been a strong advocate of intervention before changing his mind at rather the last minute.
W. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US, and the Suez Crisis (John Curtis, Hodder & Stoughton: London, 1991), p. 1.
Admiral Sir James Eberle, The Military Relationship, in W. M. R. Louis and Hedley Bull, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945, p. 51.
Telegram from US Embassy in London to State Department, 17 July 1961, Box 170, JFKL.
Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State, p. 121.
Pierre, Nuclear Politics, p. 139.
Ball, Military Nuclear Relations, p. 452.
The previous year a total of five separate sets of Anglo-American discussions connected with nuclear energy were taking place. See Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State, p. 121.
Ernest R. May and Gregory F. Treverton, ‘Defence Relationships: American Perspectives’, in W. M. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, p. 169.
Admiral Sir James Eberle, The Military Relationship, p. 151.
Coral Bell, ‘The Special Relationship’, in M. Leifer (ed.), Constraints and Adjustments in British Foreign Policy (Allen & Unwin: London, 1972), p. 119.
‘Britain Through American Eyes’, Planning Section, Western Organisations and Planning Department, 13 Feb. 1962, PREM11/5192, PRO.
Paper on ‘The Policies Affecting the Anglo-American Alliance’ (redraft), 6 January 1961, Box 1236, RG59, general records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1960–1963, Folder 611.41/ 1–1361, National Archives.
The Times, 2 August 1963.
Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy, p. 46.
Alistair Horme, Macmillan, 1957–1986, Volume 11 (Macmillan: London, 1989), p. 279. Macmillan also wrote in his diary: ‘Ike was my friend and Britain’s friend …’. Harold Macmillan Diaries (HMD), d. 42, 11 June 1961.
Home, ibid., p. 280.
In one of his less melancholic moods, he recorded in his diary: ‘it looks as if Kennedy is going to win this Presidential election. He seems definitely to be gaining ground… On the whole, I feel that Kennedy and Johnson will be more friendly than Nixon, Cabot Lodge etc. — that is, the Republicans without Eisenhower…’. HMD, d. 39, 20 October 1960.
Henry Brandon, Oral History, p. 2, JFKL.
Home, Macmillan, p. 282.
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days (André Deustch: London, 1965), p. 85.
Horne, Macmillan, p. 282.
David Nunnerley, President Kennedy and Britain (The Bodley Head: London, 1972), p. 33.
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 76.
Home, Macmillan, p. 289.
Walt Rostow, Oral History, p. 142, JFKL.
Nunnerley, President Kennedy and Britain, p. 31.
The PT-boat incident caused Kennedy irreparable damage to his already weak back.
James Reston was convinced that Kennedy’s appeal lay in his style: ‘if you study Kennedy’s wit, Kennedy’s style, it is not an American style at all, it’s a House of Commons Back-bench style…’. Reston, Oral History, p. 1, JFKL.
Home, Macmillan, p. 289. An indication of the sense of fun the men shared was clear during their last meeting at Birch Grove when they decided to play a practical joke on their advisers by pretending to suggest seriously that a Russian be made Commander-in-Chief of NATO and that the Warsaw Pact and NATO should join in a defensive alliance against China. Harold Macmillan, At The End of the Day (Macmillan: London, 1973), pp. 474–5.
Home, Macmillan, p. 287.
Home, Macmillan.
HMD, d. 41, 26 March 1961.
Home, Macmillan, p. 293.
Bundy, Oral History, p. 2, JFKL.
Nunnerley, President Kennedy and Britain, p. 28.
Kohler to Secretary of State, 31 March 1961, Box 1236, RG59, General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, National Archives.
Kennedy took Macmillan’s advice and decided to disengage and work for a neutral Laos instead of intervening militarily.
Nunnerley, President Kennedy and Britain, p. 30.
Nunnerley, President Kennedy and Britain.
HMD, d. 42, 11 June 1961.
Ormsby-Gore, speech to The Pilgrims of the United States, 14 November 1961, POF, Box 127, Countries, UK general, 6/61–12/61, JFKL.
Nunnerley, President Kennedy and Britain, p. 39. Macmillan himself confirms this in one of his diary entries where he says: ‘the position of our Ambassador — David Gore is unique. He is very close to the President and generally gets on well with the State Department…’ HMD, d. 45, 6 May 1962.
McGeorge Bundy, Oral History, p. 1, JFKL.
HMD, d. 45, 6 May 1962.
For Macmillan this was something of a front. He projected the ‘unflappability’ image as part of his political image of a wise and capable statesman. In reality, Macmillan was a highly nervous individual, prone to nausea before a speaking engagement, a constant worrier and prone to bouts of introspection and depression.
Nunnerley, President Kennedy and Britain, p. 36.
Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 431.
Home, Macmillan, p. 304.
McGeorge Bundy, Oral History, p. 3, JFKL.
Home, Macmillan, p. 305.
Correspondence between Carl Kaysen and the author.
For Key texts on the Missile Crisis, see Robert F. Kennedy, 13 Days: The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962 (Macmillan: London, 1968);
James G. Blight and David A. Welsh (eds), On The Brink: Americans and Soviets Re-examine the Cuban Missile Crisis (Farrar, Strauss & Giraux: New York, 1990);
James G. Nathan, The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited (St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1992);
Peter Boyle, ‘The British Government’s View of the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (Contemporary Record, 10: 3 Autumn 1996);
Gary D. Rawnsley, ‘How Special Is Special? The Anglo-American Alliance During the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (Contemporary Record, Vol. 9, No. 3, Winter 1995);
Len Scott and Steve Smith, ‘Lessons of October: Historians, Political Scientists, Policy-Makers and the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (International Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 4, 1994);
Len Scott, ‘Back from the Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited’ (Modern History Review Vol. 9, No. 3, 1995);
Len Scott, ‘Close to the Brink? Britain and the Cuban Missile Crisis’ (Contemporary Record 5 Winter 1991).
According to Dickie, Macmillan learned of the crisis on 17 October — a full five days before he was officially informed on 21 October. See Dickie, ‘Special’ No More, pp. 106–9.
Conclusions C.C. 63 (62) Cuba, Minute 2, CAB 128/39 PT2, PRO.
Lord Home, When The Wind Blows (Collins: London & Glasgow, 1976), p. 179.
Macmillan to Kennedy, 29 April 1962, POF, Box 127, Countries, UA Rep-UK general, Folder 7, JFKL.
Although Kennedy had a high regard for Macmillan, this did not prevent him from feeling that the British nuclear deterrent was ‘a political necessity but a piece of military foolishness’. McGeorge Bundy, Oral History, p. 3, JFKL.
Macmillan’s Visit 27–29 April 1962 Scope Paper, RG59, Box 03, General Records of the State Department, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Subject Files 1961–63, Messmer (memcons) to Mr Ball’s Presentation to NAC, Folder of Macmillan’s Visit 1962. National Archives.
Policy Directive: NATO and the Atlantic Nations, Washington, 20 April 1961, Document No. 100, Vol. XIII, FRUS.
Dean Rusk, Oral History, p. 198, JFKL.
Theodore C. Sorenson, Oral History, p. 101, JFKL. Britain also had an asset that was important to the United States as a letter from the Minister of Defence to Macmillan reveals ‘McNamara has formally confirmed to me the position originally set out by General Twining, namely that the Americans attach far greater importance to Britain maintaining her position in S. E. Asia, the Indian Ocean, Aden and, so long as we can, East Africa, than to making a larger contribution to NATO …’. In the margin he wrote that McNamara did not want to be quoted on that. MoD to PM 19 December 1961, PREM 11/3782, PRO.
Kennedy to Macmillan, POF, Box 127, Countries, UK general 1/63, JFKL.
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© 2000 Donette Murray
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Murray, D. (2000). Special Relations?. In: Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons. Cold War History Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-15004-5_2
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