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Liberalization and Regulation of Network Utilities

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Contemporary Economic Issues

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

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Abstract

Network utilities are public utilities which require a fixed network to deliver their services, and include gas, electricity, water, rail and fixed link telephony. These networks are durable, capital-intensive, and, with the possible exception of rail, serve mass markets and provide essential services. As a consequence these networks must be regulated if privately owned, but are often publicly owned, either by political preference, or by default because private investors lack confidence in the stability of regulation to supply the services at an acceptable price.

Support from the British Economic and Social Research Council under the project R000 23 3766 The Impact of Electricity Privatization on the British Energy Markets is gratefully acknowledged. I am indebted to Richard Green for comments and earlier collaboration from the anonymous referees are also gratefully acknowledged.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Cambridge, UK

    David M. Newbery

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  1. David M. Newbery
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Economic Design, Boğaziçi University, India, Turkey

    Murat R. Sertel (Professor) (Professor)

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© 1999 International Economic Association

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Newbery, D.M. (1999). Liberalization and Regulation of Network Utilities. In: Sertel, M.R. (eds) Contemporary Economic Issues. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14540-9_1

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