Abstract
The views of Rawls and the defenders of the idea of neutrality about the good constitute the mainstream of contemporary American liberal thought. But this procedural-deontological voice is not the only voice in the liberal chorus, even if it is the leading one. This chapter critically analyzes what I take to be an important expression of the minority voice of perfectionist liberalism, the political theory advanced by Joseph Raz in The Morality of Freedom and other works. In my view, while perfectionist liberalism is correct to abandon the notions of neutrality and deontology as the essence of the liberal project, it nevertheless fails to express the spirit of that project in its most compelling form. This chapter seeks to explain and support these judgments, and along the way to bring to light the sources of appeal of a more modest, pragmatic expression of the liberal spirit which might stand as an alternative to both neutralist and perfectionist expressions.
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Notes
An early challenge to Rawls’ view, arguing that it had to be at least supplemented by perfectionist considerations, was Vinit Haksar, Equality, Liberty and Perfectionism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).
Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 186–7.
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 408.
Ibid., p. 411.
Ibid., p. 133.
Ibid., p. 370, n.2.
Ibid., p. 371.
Ibid., p. 370; see also Robert George, “The Unorthodox Liberalism of Joseph Raz,” Review of Politics, vol. 53, no. 4 (Fall, 1991), p. 662.
Joseph Raz, “Liberalism, Skepticism and Democracy,” Iowa Law Review, vol. 74, no. 3 (1989), p. 785.
Jeremy Waldron, “Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Morality of Freedom,” Southern California Law Review, vol. 62 (1989), p. 1130.
W.J. Waluchow, “Critical Notice of Joseph Raz: The Morality of Freedom,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 19, no. 3 (September, 1989), p. 478.
Heidi M. Hurd, “Justifiably Punishing the Justified,” Michigan Law Review, vol. 90, no. 8 (August, 1992), p. 2217.
John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1979), p. 23.
Joseph Raz, “Facing Up: A Reply to Critics,” Southern California Law Review, vol. 62 (1989), p. 1231.
Ibid., p. 1230.
Robert George takes the opposite view in his “The Unorthodox Liberalism of Joseph Raz,” Review of Politics, vol. 53, no.4 (Fall, 1991), p. 662. I learned a great deal from George’s illuminating discussion, but cannot understand why he views Raz as “…opposing the legal prohibition of victimless immoralities as a matter of moral principle.”
For the view that it is not, see Wojciech Sadurski, “Joseph Raz on Liberal Neutrality and the Harm Principle,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (1990), pp. 130–3; Raz’s defense is at The Morality of Freedom, pp. 419–29.
On the difficulty of defining “autonomy” and “acts of coercion” independently of one another, see Jeremy Waldron, “Legislation and Moral Neutrality,” in R.E. Goodin and A. Reeve, eds, Liberal Neutrality (New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 61–83.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), ch. 1, p. 6.
Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality,” Ethics, vol. 99, no. 4 (July, 1989), p. 901; compare with Waldron, “Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz’s Political Theory,” pp. 1138–41.
Joseph Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 19, no. 1 (Winter, 1990), p. 35.
Ibid., p. 43.
Ibid., p. 46.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 56.
The contemporary theorist who, in my view, takes consequences of this most seriously and thinks it through most deeply is William Connolly. See, for example, “Identity and Difference in Liberalism,” in R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald M. Mara and Henry S. Richardson, eds, Liberalism and the Good (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 65–83.
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© 1997 Patrick Neal
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Neal, P. (1997). Perfectionism With a Liberal Face? Nervous Liberals and Raz’s Political Theory. In: Liberalism and Its Discontents. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14362-7_7
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