Abstract

Savigny, Friedrich Karl von (1779–1861). Savigny was the founder and inspiration of the German Historical School of law in the nineteenth century. Born in Frankfurt of a noble family originally from Lorraine, he studied law at various universities. As a young Professor of Roman law at Marburg, he sought to reveal the theoretical structure, which he thought must be latent, if not expressed, in the texts of Justinian’s codification, and his reputation as a scholar was established by an early work on the notion of possession (1803). Building on certain texts which required not only physical control but also a particular intention on the part of the possessor, Savigny found the central principle of possession in Roman law to be a manifestation of the possessor’s will to hold the thing for himself. He arranged the Roman texts so as to illustrate that proposition.

Keywords

Europe Marketing Hull Stein Bark 

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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Newman

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