Abstract
Earlier paragraphs (especially 1.4, 1.5, 2.16 and 2.17) have referred to the more detailed discussion of the constitutional fundamentals of European Union contained in this chapter. Here we gather together some of the strands of constitutional development highlighted above and look to see whether something more like a coherent whole can be identified. We shall also seek to identify any relevant constitutional values which underpin the institutional and substantive development of the European Union. This chapter also sets the stage for the ones which follow, where certain legal structures and relationships lying at the heart of the EU system are discussed in more detail. Constitutional principles form the foundation for both the institutional and substantive law of the European Union. While the constitutional structure may so far remain incomplete, this chapter attempts to organise a rather diverse and sometimes diffuse collection of principles under a number of important headings which address issues such as federalism, democracy and the rule of law. As a very broad range of issues are raised, inevitably the discussion in some places is brief. The reader will find it useful to cross-refer, now and later, between this chapter and those which follow to gain a better insight into how deeply these constitutional fundamentals are embedded into the institutional law of the EU.
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Further Reading
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© 1996 Jo Shaw
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Shaw, J. (1996). Constitutional Fundamentals of European Union. In: Law of the European Union. Macmillan Law Masters. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14127-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14127-2_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
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