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Abstract

Just as the Fund, rather than the Bank, had been the primary subject of public debate in the United States prior to the Bretton Woods Conference, so also, following the Conference, the Fund was the more actively opposed of the two.1

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References

  1. See George N. Halm, International Monetary Cooperation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1945), particularly pp. 86–180. See also Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969). On the subject of the working Bank, see Robert E. Asher and Edward S. Mason, The World Bank since Bretton Woods (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973). See also the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1946–1953 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954).

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  2. See ‘Reconstruction Fund in Joint Account with Foreign Governments for Rehabilitation, Stabilization of Currencies, and Reconstruction,’ Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-Eighth Congress, Second Session on H. J. Res. 226 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1944). Hearings were conducted on April 25, 26, 27, 28, and May 16, 17, 1944, pp. 11–12.

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  3. Ibid., p. 11.

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  4. Hearings on H. J. Res. 226, p. 11. Several witnesses appeared in support of this plan: Emeritus Professor Edwin Kemmerer of Princeton University, Benjamin Beckhart of the Chase National Bank, Professor James Washington Bell of Northwestern University, J. Spencer Smith of the New Jersey State Board of Commerce and Navigation, and Francis H. Brownell of the American Smelting and Refining Company; and several papers were filed — most notably a paper by Professor Benjamin M. Anderson, Jr., of the University of California at Los Angeles. The primary point of most of this testimony was that the gold standard should be resurrected.

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  5. Ibid., p. 126

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  6. Congressional Record, 78th Congress, 2nd session, vol. 90, part 5 (June 13, 1944 to August 24, 1944), p. 6926.

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  7. The New York Times, September 16, 1944, p. 26.

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  8. See the New York Times, February 5, 1945, p. 21.

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  9. See the New York Times, February 7, 1945, p. 9.

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  10. Ibid.

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  11. See the New York Times, February 13, 1945, p. 17.

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  12. Some of the important economists who favored the Agreements were J. M. Clark and W. C. Mitchell of Columbia; Gottfried Haberler and Wassily Leontief of Harvard; J. B. Condliffe of California; Frank D. Graham of Princeton; Frank H. Knight and Jacob Viner of Chicago; and Calvin B. Hoover of Duke. See the New York Times, February 19, 1945, p. 10. There were some economists, especially the members of the Economists National Committee on Monetary Policy, who consistently opposed the Bretton Woods organizations.

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  13. See ‘Bretton Woods Agreements Act,’ Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session of H. R. 221 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1945). Hearings took place on March 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, 1945.

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  14. See ‘Bretton Woods Agreements Act,’ Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session, on H. R. 3314 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1945). Hearings took place on June 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25 and 28, 1945.

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  15. The Senators who voted for the bill were Wagner (D) of New York; Tobey (R) of New Hampshire; Barkley (D) of Kentucky; Radcliff (D) of Virginia; Glass (D) of Virginia; Bankhead (D) of Alabama; Downey (D) of California; Murdock (D) of Utah; McFarland (D) of Arizona; Taylor (D) of Idaho; Fulbright (D) of Arkansas; Buck (R) of Delaware; Hickenlooper (R) of Iowa; and Mitchell (D) of Washington. Those opposed were Taft (R) of Ohio; Thomas (R) of Idaho; Butler (R) of Nebraska; and Millikin (R) of Colorado. See the New York Times, July 4, 1945, p. 1.

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  16. See ‘Export-Import Bank Act of 1945,’ Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session, on H. R. 3771 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1945). Hearings took place on July 11 and 12, 1945.

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  17. The British feeling was voiced by Winston Churchill when he said, ‘I cannot believe that so great a nation whose lend-lease policy was characterized by me as the most unsordid act in the history of the world would proceed in such a rough and harsh manner as to hamper a faithful ally — an ally who held the fort while their own American armaments were prepared.’ The New York Times, September 25, 1945, p. 5.

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  18. See R. F. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951), pp. 586–623. See also Lord Robbins, Autobiography of an Economist (London: Macmillan, 1971), pp. 203–12; and David Rees, Harry Dexter White (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1973), pp. 361–7.

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  19. The loan was for $3.75 billion. Under the terms agreed upon, Great Britain was to abolish all exchange controls which hindered American exports to Britain; to eliminate, by December 31, 1946, any import discriminations against American exports (thus putting the United States on a par with the Dominions as far as imperial preferences were concerned); to support the American plan for an International Trade Organization; to abolish within one year of the loan ratification, the ‘dollar pool’ of the Sterling Area; and to begin to settle the ‘blocked sterling’ held in London for the various members of the Sterling Area.

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  20. The New York Times, December 13, 1945, p. 11.

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  21. Ladislas Farago, ‘World Bank: Council of Securities,’ United Nations World, 1 (April, 1947), p. 24.

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  22. George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 292–3. It was this event which induced Kennan to prepare his famous long (8,000-word) telegram explaining to the State Department his views of Soviet action and policy.

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  23. See Rees, op. cit., pp. 377–90.

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  24. See Harrod, op. cit., pp. 624–39, particularly p. 630.

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  25. It has been suggested that Vinson, himself, was interested in the job, but Truman was considering appointing Vinson, a close friend, to succeed James Byrnes as Secretary of State, and constituents in Kentucky were clamoring for Vinson to run for the Senate and then for President. In April, 1946, such speculation became idle, for Vinson was appointed to the vacancy on the Supreme Court occasioned by the death of Justice Harlan Stone. That Vinson could have been elected President of the World Bank was unlikely, for he would have been opposed by the British who felt that Vinson’s haughty behavior at the inaugural meeting at Savannah had contributed to the death shortly thereafter of Lord Keynes. On this general subject, see Mason and Asher, op. cit., pp. 40–1. See also Oral History Project of Columbia University, interviews recorded in the summer of 1961 on the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, interview of Ansel F. Luxford.

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  26. The New York Times, June 5, 1946, p. 12.

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  27. First Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Proceedings and Related Documents, p. 5.

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  28. Ibid., p. 10.

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  29. Ibid., p. 27.

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  30. Ibid., p. 44.

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  31. ‘Closing Address of Mr. Eugene Meyer,’ First Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Proceedings and Related Documents, p. 16.

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  32. ‘Address of Mr. Eugene Meyer,’ First Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, Proceedings and Related Documents, p. 11.

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  33. Editorial in the American Banker, October 29, 1946, p. 4.

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  34. American Banker, December 3, 1946, p. 1.

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  35. Emilio G. Collado, Address before the Convention of the Investment Bankers Association, December 3, 1946 (a pamphlet issued by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), pp. 7–8.

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  36. Eugene Meyer, Address before the Annual Meeting of the Life Insurance Association of America, New York, December 13, 1946. A pamphlet issued by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, p. 4.

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  37. ‘World Commerce and Industry,’ World Report, I (December 17, 1946), p. 41.

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  38. American Banker, December 5, 1946, p. 1.

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  39. Walter Lippmann, ‘Vacancy at the World Bank,’ the Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1947, p. 4.

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  40. Gardner, op. cit., p. 292.

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  41. Hugh Ripman, who came to the Bank’s Administration Department from the British civil service, commented in a personal interview of August, 1961, that American lawyers played a role in the Bank (and in the American administration generally) which was unfamiliar to Europeans. He attributed the disproportionate influence of American lawyers to the American system of public education which concentrated on training technicians. Thus, lawyers were needed in American business as surrogates for those whose writing and speaking skills were underdeveloped.

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  42. American Banker, March 4, 1947, p. 4.

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  43. According to Emilio Collado (personal interview, July, 1950), Mr. Eugene Meyer had expected the United States government to arrange for the marketing in the United States of World Bank bonds. But the officials of the United States government regarded this as a job for the staff of the Bank. It was this impasse which substantially explains Mr. Meyer’s inaction and consequent ‘bad press.’

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  44. Concerning the substantial history of the competition between the World Bank and the United States Export-Import Bank, see Mason and Asher, op. cit., pp. 494–504.

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  45. ‘World Bank Plans Slow Start in Financing Recovery Programs,’ World Report, II (April 1, 1947), p. 30.

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  46. ‘Statement on the Netherlands Loan,’ Press Release No. 60, August 7, 1947. Under the original terms of this loan agreement, the entire $195 million were to be United States dollars. It was later agreed, however, that $1 million were to be made available in Belgian francs. In May, 1948, the Bank borrowed $4 million in Swiss francs and turned them over to the Netherlands in lieu of an equivalent amount in United States dollars. Thus, only $190 million in United States dollars were actually made available to the Netherlands under the terms of this loan.

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  47. The most important of the short-term borrowing had been that from the United States Export-Import Bank in 1946. It was anticipated at the time of the International Bank loan that this short-term debt would be paid for with the proceeds of the liquidation of Dutch-held American securities. See ‘Statement on the Netherlands Loan,’ op. cit., p. 10.

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  48. See ‘Statement on the Danish Loan,’ Press Release No. 61, August 22, 1947.

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  49. See ‘Statement on the Loan to Luxembourg,’ Press Release No. 64, August 28, 1947.

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  50. Kennan, op. cit., pp. 324–53.

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  51. See Proceedings, Second Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, October 31, 1947), p. 8.

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  52. See Press Release No. 74, January 7, 1948, p. 1.

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  53. See Second Annual Report, p. 19.

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  54. See Press Release No. 63, August 27, 1947, p. 1.

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  55. Press Release No. 52, June 10, 1947, p. 1.

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  56. Kennan, op. cit., pp. 397–500.

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  57. Michael L. Hoffman, ‘East-West Trade Aim of Loan Plan,’ the New York Times, April 25, 1948, p. 20.

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  58. Press Release No. 117, September 29, 1948, pp. 4–5.

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  59. Early in 1949, President Tito of Yugoslavia, confronted by a show of hostile Soviet force, turned to the Bank for help. A mission was quickly dispatched which not only arranged a Bank loan but informed interested governments of the situation with results which kept Yugoslavia out of total Soviet control.

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  60. See Eugene R. Black, Address before the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Investment Bankers Association, Hollywood, Florida, December 2, 1947 (a pamphlet issued by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), p. 3.

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  61. Press Release No. 55, July 15, 1947, p. 1.

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  62. Ibid., p. 2.

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  63. Robert L. Garner, Address before the Thirty-Fourth National Foreign Trade Convention, St. Louis, Missouri, October 20, 1947 (mimeographed by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, October 20, 1947), p. 3. Cf. also Black, op. cit., p. 6.

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  64. Personal interview, July, 1961.

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  65. See Rees, op. cit., pp. 406–26.

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© 1996 Robert W. Oliver

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Oliver, R.W. (1996). The Ratification and Inauguration of the Bank. In: International Economic Co-Operation and the World Bank. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-14081-7_9

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