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Stalemate and Restraint: November 1951–July 1953

  • David Clayton
Part of the Studies in Military and Strategic History book series (SMSH)

Abstract

British policy towards China did not change significantly under a Conservative government: Britain would leave the door open for an improvement in political and economic relations between China and the West and try to moderate American thinking on China. This strategy depended above all else on an armistice being signed for the Korean War, which would, Britain hoped, allow economic and military measures against the PRC to be scaled down, and then perhaps, in the longer term, with an easing of Sino-American antagonism, open the way towards closer diplomatic and economic contact between China and the West. Unfortunately, the process towards peace in Korea was arduous and drawn out. As a result, Churchill’s Conservative government faced the same dilemma as Attlee’s Labour government: to acquiesce in an aggressive US approach towards China or to follow a moderate liberal line.

Keywords

Chinese Mainland British Government Conservative Government American Policy Modus Vivendi 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    Also quoted in M. Dockrill, ‘The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean Truce Negotiations, July 1951 – July 1953’, p. 102, in J. Cotton and I. Neary, eds, The Korean War in History, Manchester 1989;Google Scholar
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  3. 2.
    Clement Attlee, ‘Britain and America: Common Aims, Different Opinions’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 32, no. 2, Jan. 1954.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    M. Gilbert, Never Despair, W.S. Churchill, Vol. VIII, 1945–65, London 1988, pp. 680 and 918.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© David Clayton 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Clayton
    • 1
  1. 1.University of YorkUK

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