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Political Institutions, Organised Groups and Economic Policy

  • Tor Skålnes
Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

The disciplines of political science and economics have in recent years been profoundly influenced by a liberal political economy which posits models of free trade and limited state intervention as normative standards of rationality in economic policy. Although neo-liberal economics has gained increasing favour with academics and policy-makers around the world over the last fifteen years, there is continued and widespread failure of governments to abide by the maxims of non-intervention and minimal protection of domestic industries. Presumably, since both theory and practical experience indicate the economic superiority of freer trade over protectionism, the reasons for persistently high trade barriers must be sought in the realm of politics.

Keywords

Interest Group Political Institution State Autonomy Economic Adjustment Government Budget Deficit 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© Tor Skålnes 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tor Skålnes
    • 1
  1. 1.Chr Michelsen InstituteNorway

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