What to do with Communist Bureaucrats from Bureaucratic Communism: The German Case
Many studies of communist regimes have relied heavily on Max Weber’s theory of the routinisation of chiliastic rule. These studies suggest that breaks with the inequalities and cleavages of traditional societies have been led by revolutionary militants who win mass support for radical programmes of wealth redistribution. Upon coming to power, these militants (‘chiefs,’ in Weber’s terminology) create the institutional means to deliver their revolutionary programmes with party/ bureaucratic élites (‘administrative staff’) that not only implement policy, but also serve as a reservoir of support and protection for the ruler.1 These studies further suggest that a tension between the chiliastic revolutionary vision and its institutionalisation will typically develop and that bureaucratic routinisers will ultimately hold sway. ‘Neo-traditional stagnation’ is the result, with huge institutional apparatuses maintaining status and privilege at the expense of both political freedom and economic viability.2
KeywordsEurope Expense Posit Hunt Trench
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