Institutions and Economic Development in the Advanced Countries

  • John Zysman


This chapter considers the persisting relation between national institutions and diversity in the organization of capitalist economies. There are varied ways of organizing market economies; that is there is more than just one kind of capitalism, more than just one course of development which some countries travel more quickly than others.1 Over the last few decades analysts have recognized that there are multiple capitalisms, multiple market economies, each representing a distinct trajectory of development. This approach proposed here is also intended to show that historical institutionalism is a necessary complement to an institutionalism more familiar in economics. The historical institutionalism frames problems and provides answers to puzzles that concern microeconomics based institutionalism.


Labour Market Financial System Institutional Arrangement Institutional Structure National System 


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Copyright information

© Associazione di Storia e Studi sull’Impressa 1996

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  • John Zysman

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