Abstract
Many people who have not thought systematically about the question of foreign aid would probably agree with the view that the governments of richer countries ought, like rich individuals, to give aid to poor countries for reasons of humanity, kindness and the like. At the same time, or rather in other conversations, the same people might very well also subscribe to the view that governments ought to do what their electorates want them to do, or to the view that governments ought to look after the national interest especially in their foreign policy (and whatever they do that may benefit other countries should be consistent with this), or to the view that governments ought to stick to international agreements and abide by international law.
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Notes
See, e.g., T. Nagel, ‘Ruthlessness in Public Life’, in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) for a useful exploration of the relationships between different principles, as well as a perceptive discussion of issues germane to this paper.
See N. Dower, World Poverty Challenge and Response (York: Ebor Press, 1983). I should add that in this work I largely assume the continuity thesis and do not go into the complications which this chapter addresses and which have come to interest me more recently. See also my ‘World Poverty’, in P. Singer (ed.), Companion to Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) pp. 273–83.
For useful surveys of different ethical approaches in development studies, see, e.g., R. Riddell, Foreign Aid Reconsidered (London: Currey, 1987), and D. Gaspar, ‘Distribution and Development Ethic’, in R. Apthorpe and A. Krahl (eds), Development Studies: Critique and Renewal (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986).
C. R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1979) p. vii.
See, e.g., P. Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) ch. 8. Note that if the principle of beneficence (or its variant: preventing preventable evils) is interpreted as requiring that we help as much as we can, then it is a very radical principle indeed. But if it is interpreted as a principle requiring substantial helping, either by individuals or by governments, it is more motivationally manageable. See, e.g., Dower, World Poverty Challenge.
See, e.g., D. Luban, ‘The Just War and Human Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9 (2), 1980, following H. Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence and US Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980). The claim that ‘human rights are the demand of all humanity on all humanity’ sums up well a basic position, which assumes rather than argues for the claim that governments are bound by cosmopolitan obligations cast in human rights form, and constitute a good example of the kind of continuity thesis I have in mind.
See R. J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) Pt 3.
M. Walzer, ‘The Moral Standing of States: a Response to Four Critics’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9: 3 (1980).
H. Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977) p. 22.
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Dower, N. (1993). Are Government Aid and Private Charity Morally on a Par?. In: Carty, A., Singer, H.W. (eds) Conflict and Change in the 1990s. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12728-3_5
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