Abstract
In the summer of 1941, the United States and Great Britain signed the Atlantic Charter, which functioned both as the unofficial Allied utopia for which war was being waged, and as a policy document on which postwar construction could eventually take place. The Charter was later also signed by the Soviet Union, which thereby also promised to ‘respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live’.1 We have already quoted President Roosevelt, stating his hope that Stalin would not try to ‘annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace’. It was both these sometimes overtly, sometimes implicitly formulated expectations by Western politicians which have given rise to the so-called ‘Yalta myth’.
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Notes
Th. A. Wilson, The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay, 1941 (1969) pp. 174–207.
M. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (1962) p. 114.
President John F. Kennedy, The New York Times, 15 October 1962.
E. K. Lindley (ed.), The Winds of Freedom. Selection from the Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State Dean Rusk January 1961 August 1962 (1963) p. 242.
Kennan, ‘Polycentrism and Western Policy’, in Foreign Affairs (1964) p. 171.
See Robert O. Freedman, Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc. A Study of Soviet Economic Pressure Against Yugoslavia, Albania, and Communist China (1970) pp. 18–57.
Wilczynski, East-West Trade (1969) pp. 244, 246.
Quoted in Funigiello, American-Soviet Trade (1988) p. 60.
Kovrig, Myth of Liberation (1973) p. 142.
Adler-Karlsson, Western Economic Warfare (1968) p. 105.
H. Finer, Dulles over Suez (1964) p. 343.
Pierre Hassner, ‘Western European Perceptions of the USSR’, in Daedalus (1979) p. 117.
Brzezinski and Griffith, ‘Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe’, in Foreign Affairs (1961) p. 644.
Brzezinski, Alternative to Partition. For a Broader Conception of America’s Role in Europe (1965) p. 154.
Funigiello, American-Soviet Trade (1988) p. 150.
Johnson, The Vantage Point. Perspectives of the Presidency 1963–1969 (1971) pp. 470–471.
Johnson, ‘Making Europe Whole: An Unfinished Task’, in Department of State Bulletin, 24 October 1964, pp. 622–625.
In Vaughn Davis Bomet: The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson (1983) p. 169.
H.-A. Jacobsen (ed.) Misstrauische Nachbarn. Deutsche Ostpolitik 1919/1970. Dokumentation and Analyse (1970) p. 348.
Joffe, ‘The View from Bonn: The Tacit Alliance’, in Gordon (ed.), Eroding Empire (1987) p. 163.
Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy Under de Gaulle and Pompidou. The Politics of Grandeur (1974) p. 352 (emphasis added).
Hassner, ‘The View from Paris’, in Gordon (ed.), Eroding Empire (1987) p. 206.
Funigiello, American-Soviet Trade (1988) p. 222.
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© 1992 Peter van Ham
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van Ham, P. (1992). Strategies of Economic Differentiation: Evoking the Yalta Myth. In: Western Doctrines on East-West Trade. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12610-1_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12610-1_14
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