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Corporate Restructuring: Evidence from the Stock Market

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European Industrial Restructuring in the 1990s

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Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to review the empirical evidence on the effect of various forms of corporate restructuring on security prices of the firms involved. Three types of restructuring will be considered: takeovers, leveraged buyouts and stock repurchases. Because there exists a massive literature on these issues, this review will be necessarily incomplete. Although most of the studies discussed in this chapter involve US data, results on three European countries (UK, France and Belgium) will also be presented.

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Authors
  1. Theo Vermaelen
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. INSEAD, France

    Karel Cool (Associate Professor of Strategic Management), Damien J. Neven (Associate Professor of Economics) & Ingo Walter (Swiss Bank Corporation Professor of International Management) (Associate Professor of Strategic Management),  (Associate Professor of Economics) &  (Swiss Bank Corporation Professor of International Management)

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© 1992 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Vermaelen, T. (1992). Corporate Restructuring: Evidence from the Stock Market. In: Cool, K., Neven, D.J., Walter, I. (eds) European Industrial Restructuring in the 1990s. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12582-1_8

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