One of the consistent difficulties of the burdensharing debate is that the ‘burden’, a term which implies notions of equality or inequality, is a subjective measurement. The US position often stresses ‘quantitative’ measures of expenditure to prove that its erstwhile allies should do more. The US’s European allies, when they reply, are more fond of the less quantifiable measures that emphasize hidden costs, social dislocation and the provision of rent-free land, or the differences in cost structures between a conscript and a volunteer military system. The two types of burden I have termed ‘input’ and ‘output’ respectively.
KeywordsPublic Good Purchasing Power Parity Stereotypical Threat Collective Good Military Expenditure
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Notes and References
- 1.U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Burdensharing Panel, Report of the Defense Burdensharing Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, 100th Congress, 2nd. session (Washington DC: GPO, Aug. 1988).Google Scholar
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- 20.See T. Sandler, and J.C. Murdoch, ‘Defense Burdens and Prospects for the Northern European Allies,’ in D. B. H. Denoon, (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1986) pp. 103–113.Google Scholar
- 27.For a brief description of the NATO Infrastructure Fund see, J. R. Golden, The Dynamics of Change in NATO: A Burden-sharing Perspective (Praeger: New York, 1983) pp. 78–82.Google Scholar