Cognitivist Philosophy

Abstract

Having given a review of IP research on human speech perception, and stated a need for consideration of the philosophical or metatheoretical framework within which this work is carried out, the next step is to set out exactly what that framework is, as a basis for discussion of the issues I believe to be significant. As already mentioned, IP emerged as part of the development of cognitive science. Cognitive science also includes another branch specifically concerned with matters of philosophy related to its overall enterprise. In fact, the metatheory of speech perception research is not quite identical with the philosophy of cognitive science in general. It has been seen already that many psycholinguists (and other psychologists) have been doing metatheoretical analyses of their discipline, and in some cases there can be differences in their views and those of cognitivist philosophers. Despite problems of definition, however, I think it is possible, by judiciously drawing on work in cognitivist philosophy and cognitive psychology metatheory, to identify a philosophical position which is used as an explicit statement and justification of the IP framework.¹ When I use the terms ‘cognitivist philosophy’ or ‘cognitivism’ (cf. Costall and Still 1987), I shall be using them in this slightly restricted sense.