Abstract
The past two years have witnessed a diplomatic revolution in East-West relations that has undermined if not overturned the essentially conflictual conceptions that governed the conduct of both sides during the Cold War, and that has significantly altered and greatly diminished the sense of military threat each alliance was formerly thought to pose to the other. In Central Europe, in particular, the Cold War military confrontation is being dismantled: the division of Germany has ended; the Warsaw Pact has collapsed; Soviet forces are being withdrawn from Eastern Europe; and the agreement on conventional forces in Europe, signed at the Paris summit in November 1990 after negotiations of remarkable swiftness, will reduce and regulate the deployment of conventional forces in Europe and will put in place a substantial mechanism of verification. While the net military impact of these developments is debatable, there can be no doubt that the military environment in Central Europe is being dramatically transformed and threat perceptions have changed accordingly.
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Notes and References
I will necessarily treat these briefly here. For a somewhat full discussion, see Steven E. Miller, ‘Northern Seas in Soviet and American Strategy’, in Sverre Lodgaard and Marek Thee (eds) Nuclear Disengagement in Europe (London: Taylor & Francis, 1983) pp. 117–38.
See, for example, John Lehman, Command of the Seas: Building the 600 Ship Navy (New York: Scribner, 1988).
For an excellent analysis of NATO’s reinforcement needs and capabilities, see Barry R. Posen, ‘NATO’s Reinforcement Capability’, Defense Analysis, vol. 5, no. 4 (1989) pp. 327–40.
See, for example, the analysis of Karl Lautenschläger, who argues that the USSR was far short of possessing the naval capability necessary to seriously disrupt the sea lanes. ‘The Submarine in Naval Warfare, 1901–2001’, in Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera (eds) Naval Strategy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) especially pp. 278–82.
See especially, Michael MccGwire, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution) 1987, notably pp. 90–116
This is not the place to outline all the arguments and rationales associated with US naval policy, but it is worth noting the argument that the more disturbing the Soviets find this strategy, the more effective it will be as a deterrent. For an overview of the controversy associated with the Maritime Strategy, see Steven E. Miller, ‘The Maritime Strategy and Geopolitics in the High North’ in Clive Archer (ed.) The Soviet Union and Northern Waters (London: Routledge, 1988) pp. 205–38.
See, for example, Charles C. Petersen, ‘Soviet Military Objectives in the Arctic Theater and How They Might Be Attained’, Research Memorandum CRM 86–204, (Washington DC: Center for Naval Analyses, September 1986).
As clearly exemplified in Peter Tarpgaard and Robert E. Mechanic, Future Budget Requirements for the 600-Ship Navy (Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office, September 1985)
Shunji Taoka, ‘East-West Naval Force Comparison’, in S. Taoka and R. Fieldhouse, Superpowers at Sea: An Assessment of the Naval Arms Race (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) especially pp. 59–62
See, for example, the comments by Norwegian Minister of Defence, Johan Jörgen Hoist, reported in Barry Blechman and Gunnar Gunnarson (eds) Arms Control and Confidence-building in Northern Waters (Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press, 1990) pp. 14–17.
For example, Adam Siegel, ‘Just Say No! The US Navy and Arms Control: A Misguided Policy?’, Naval War College Review, Winter 1990, pp. 73–86.
Barry M. Blechman et al., The US Stake in Naval Arms Control (Washington DC: The Henry Stimson Center, October 1990).
This question is examined in detail in Steven E. Miller, ‘Naval Arms Control and Northern Europe: Constraints and Prospects’, in Sverre Lodgaard (ed.) Naval Arms Control (London: Sage Publishers, 1990).
According to the IISS Military Balance, comparing the 1989–90 and 1990–1 editions, the USSR reduced its number of tactical submarines by thirty-eight and its number of principal surface combatants by thirty-seven during the past year. However, this reflects a severe bloc obsolescence problem rather than serious restructuring of the Soviet navy, and most of the retired equipment was so dated as to be of debatable utility. For a careful analysis of the age of the Soviet fleet, which emphasises the remarkably high ratios of out of date vessels it possesses, see Robert van Tol, ‘A Naval Force Comparison in Northern and Atlantic Waters’, in Clive Archer (ed.) The Soviet Union and Northern Waters (London: Routledge, 1988) pp. 140–5
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© 1992 László Valki
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Miller, S.E. (1992). Maritime Threat Perceptions after the Cold War. In: Valki, L. (eds) Changing Threat Perceptions and Military Doctrines. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12060-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12060-4_7
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