Abstract
Well before his election as President, Eisenhower was briefed by Oppenheimer and others on the new strategic thinking that was being generated in the summer studies of the early 1950s.1 To judge by his administration’s course of action in 1953 and 1954 he agreed with much of what he heard. In particular, an emphasis on continental defence became ‘the principal innovation of the New Look’.2 There were many reasons for this, not least the first test explosion of the Soviet H-bomb programme in August 1953. But one important factor was undoubtedly the intense scientific effort which began to overcome the ‘technical difficulties in the way of an effective continental defense system [which had previously] seemed almost insuperable’.3
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
J. Alsop and S. Alsop, We Accuse! The Story of the Miscarriage of Justice in the Case of J. Robert Oppenheimer ( London: Gollancz, 1955 ), p. 44
J. M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (1959 — ch. 1, n. 34 ), pp. 132–5.
S. P. Huntington, The Common Defense ( New York: Columbia U. Press, 1961 ), p. 78.
J. R. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower (1977 — ch. 3, n. 1), p. 68.
D. Z. Beckler, ‘The Precarious Life of Science in the White House’, Daedalus, vol. 103, no. 3, 1974, p. 117.
John Rigden has placed on record Rabi’s ‘enormous respect’ for Eisenhower. Rabi also told Rigden that Eisenhower’s ‘besetting sin, to my mind, was his modesty’: J. S. Rigden, Rabi: Scientist and Citizen (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 238.
National Security Council, TCP Report, ‘Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack’ (1955 — ch. 7, n. 29); Killian, Sputnik (n. 5 ), p. 70; M. E. Davies and W. R. Harris, RAND’s Role in the Evolution of Balloon and Satellite Observation Systems (1988 — ch. 4, n. 32); R. M. Bissell, COHC Interview with E. Edwin, 5 June 1967, p. 38.
RAND Corporation, Project Feed Back Summary Report R-262, 1 March 1954, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1954), p. vii.
R. L. Perry, Origins of the USAF Space Program, 1945–1956 Historical Publication Series 62–24–10 (Andrews Air Force Base, MD: USAF Systems Command, 1962 ), pp. 36 – 43.
E. Bergaust and W. Beller, Satellite! (London: Scientific Book Club, 1957), pp. 34–9; NHO — W. von Braun (Biog. File), ‘A Minimum Satellite Vehicle Based on Components available from missile developments of the Army Ordnance Corps’, Guided Missile Development Division, Ordnance Missile Laboratories, Redstone Arsenal (mimeo), 15 September 1954. The closest contemporary public proposal to the Orbiter scheme assumed that a balloon satellite weighing 10 lb and inflatable to 15 feet in diameter could be placed in orbit at 200 miles altitude by ‘an improved version of the V-2’: I. M. Levitt, ‘Geodetic Significance of a Minimum Satellite Vehicle’ in Bericht über den V. Internationalen Astronautischen Kongress Proc. Fifth IAF Congress, Innsbruck, August 1954 (Vienna: Friedrich Hecht, 1955. )
C. Mc. Green and M. Lomask, Vanguard: a History (1971 — ch. 6, n. 42 ), p. 30.
D. R. Smith, ‘They’re Following Our Script: Walt Disney’s Trip to Tomorrowland’, Future, vol. 1, no. 2, 1978, p. 59.
H. L. Goodwin, The Science Book of Space Travel (1954 — ch. 2, n. 14 ), p. 3.
V. Berkner, ‘Science and National Strength’, Bull. Atomic Scientists, vol. 9, no. 5, June 1953
L. V. Berkner, ‘Science and Military Power’, Bull. Atomic Scientists, vol. 9, no. 12, December 1953.
L. V. Berkner, ‘Earth Satellites and Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 36, no. 2, 1958, pp. 231, 221.
D. K. Price, Government and Science (1954 — ch. 3, n. 1 ), p. 96.
For the narrow institutional base of the science advice community, see: D. S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science ( New York: New American Library, 1971 ), pp. 15–16
Killian’s estimate is cited without a direct reference in D. J. Kevles, The Physicists (1979 — ch. 3, n. 1 ), p. 394.
D. K. Price, The Scientific Estate (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U. Press, 1965), p. 12 — emphasis in original.
W. R. Schilling, ‘Scientists, Foreign Policy, and Politics’ in R. M. Gilpin and C. Wright (eds), Scientists and National Policy-Making (1964 — ch. 8, n. 84 ), p. 163.
US Congress, House, Astronautics, Hearings: Astronautics and Space Exploration (1958 — ch. 6, n. 24 ), p. 1037.
K. R. Stehling, Project Vanguard (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), p. 104. That the ‘science only’ position of its 1954 report was adopted by the ARS only as a temporary expedient is strongly suggested by a comparison with the Society’s later report, prepared in the summer of 1957 and sent to Eisenhower just after Sputnik 1: DDEL — WHO: OSAST, Alphabetical Not-Top-Secret series, Box 15, Folder: Space (Oct. 1957) (1), Report by the Space Flight Technical Committee of the ARS, ‘Space Flight Program’, 23 August 1957, revised 10 October 1957.
J. R. Killian, ‘Shaping a Public Policy for the Space Age’ in L. P. Bloomfield (ed. ), Outer Space: Prospects for Man and Society ( Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962 ), p. 184.
RAND Corporation, Social Sciences Division, Proc. Conf. on Psychological Effects (1949 — ch. 4, n. 32), p. 105.
RAND Corporation, Social Sciences Division, Summary Report of Conf. on Psychological Effects (1949 — ch. 6, n. 32), p. 15.
RAND Corporation, P. Kecskemeti, The Satellite Rocket Vehicle (1950 — ch. 4, n. 32), pp. 9, 10, 22.
O. Schachter, ‘Who Owns the Universe?’ in C. Ryan (ed. ), Across the Space Frontier (1952 — ch. 4, n. 48).
M. Caidin, Vanguard! the Story of the First Man-Made Satellite (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957), pp. 265, 267; Bergaust and Beller, Satellite! (n. 15 ), p. 42.
US Congress, House, Armed Services, Hearings: Investigation of National Defense Missiles (1958 — ch. 3, n. 57 ), p. 4625.
G. Vaeth, 200 Miles Up 2nd edn (New York: Ronald Press, 1955 ), p. 237.
US Congress, House, Appropriations, Subcommittee on Independent Offices, Hearings: National Science Foundation: Report on the International Geophysical Year (85th Congress, 1st Session, 1957 ), p. 74.
D. Pearson and J. Anderson, U. SA. — Second Class Power? (1958 — ch. 1, n. 40), pp. 138–41.
US Congress, House, Armed Services, Employment (n. 87), p. 1006; D. W. Cox, America’s New Policy Makers: the Scientists’ Rise to Power ( Philadelphia: Chilton Books, 1964 ), p. 71.
L. Malian, Space Satellites ( Greenwich, CT: Fawcett Publications, 1958 ), p. 124.
Haley, Rocketry and Space Exploration ( Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1958 ), p. 155
J. Grey and V. Grey, Space Flight Report to the Nation ( New York: Basic Books, 1962 ).
W. S. Bainbridge, The Spaceflight Revolution: a Sociological Study ( New York: John Wiley, 1976 ), pp. 132–7.
Copyright information
© 1991 Rip Bulkeley
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bulkeley, R. (1991). Advice for Eisenhower. In: The Sputniks Crisis and Early United States Space Policy. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11981-3_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11981-3_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-11983-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-11981-3
eBook Packages: Physics and AstronomyPhysics and Astronomy (R0)