Advertisement

Abstract

As it became clear at a relatively late stage that satellites would be attempted by more than one country during the IGY, the question emerged of what arrangements would be needed for international cooperation. The IGY’s ‘rules’ for satellites were frequently referred to after the sputniks, but their nature and status remain elusive to this day, partly because in some important respects they were never finally agreed between the two main parties, the Soviet Union and the United States, and partly because few Western authors have discussed them objectively. Historical perceptions have been strongly coloured by the extent to which national interests became involved in this part of the IGY, due amongst other things to the security issues associated with rocket launch vehicles when both superpowers were striving to develop the ICBM and to the high stakes that were being played for in the satellite projects, both in national prestige and in career prospects for the scientists and other professional people concerned.

Keywords

Launch Vehicle Artificial Satellite American Scientist Soviet Scientist Satellite Experiment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes and References

  1. 1.
    US Congress, House, Armed Services, Hearings: Investigation of National Defense Missiles (1958 — ch. 3, n. 57 ), p. 4304.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    F. J. Krieger, Behind the Sputniks (1958 — ch. 7, n. 39), pp. 330, 114.Google Scholar
  3. 8.
    P. J. Klass, Secret Sentries in Space ( New York: Random House, 1971 ), pp. 30–1Google Scholar
  4. M. R. Beschloss, May-Day (1986 — ch. 5, n. 9 ), p. 155Google Scholar
  5. P. Pringle and W. Arkin, SLOP: Nuclear War from the Inside ( London: Sphere Books, 1983 ), pp. 51–2.Google Scholar
  6. 18.
    Annals, vol. VI, L. V. Berkner (ed. ), Manual on Rockets and Satellites (1958), pp. 465, 468, 470.Google Scholar
  7. 22.
    H. S. W. Massey and M. O. Robins, History of British Space Science ( Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 1986 ), p. 43CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. I. Southall, Woomera ( London: Angus and Robertson, 1962 ), pp. 214–15.Google Scholar
  9. 32.
    Tadeo Takenounchi of Tokyo University subsequently tried to calculate the exact launching times and launch site of the first two sputniks from their orbital coordinates. The first official Soviet statement on the geographical coordinates of the Baikonur Cosmodrome (Tyuratam) was issued in May 1961: K. W. Gatland, Astronautics in the Sixties (1962 — ch$11, n. 1), p. 139.Google Scholar
  10. 47.
    US Congress, Senate, Space Sciences, Hearings: NASA Authorization for Fiscal Year 1960 pt 1(86th Congress, 1st Session, 1959 ), pp. 661–4; H. L. Richter, W. F. Sampson and R. Stevens, ‘Microlock: a Minimum Weight Radio Instrumentation System for a Satellite’ in M. Alperin and M. Stem (eds) Vistas in Astronautics, Proc. First Annual Air Force Office of Scientific Research Astronautics Symposium, San Diego, February 1957, ( New York: Pergamon, 1958 )Google Scholar
  11. W. H. Pickering with J. H. Wilson, ‘Countdown to Space Exploration: a Memoir of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory’ in R. C. Hall (ed. ) History of Rocketry and Astronautics (1977 — ch. 3, n. 51). Both tracking systems were radio interferometers, but Minitrack, which rapidly developed into NASA’s primary tracking and telemetry system, was significantly more accurate than Microlock, with a peak accuracy of 20–30 sec of arc by comparison with 3 to 4 min of arc: Annals, vol. VI (1958) pp. 279, 351, 409, 411.Google Scholar
  12. 48.
    Circular on US satellite programme from IGY Secretary General (Nicolet), 6 August 1956 (ICSU Archives, CN-CIR-15–568/6), p. 5; see also F. I. Ordway, ‘The U. S. Satellite Vehicle Program’, Astronautica Acta, vol. 2, no. 3, 1956.Google Scholar
  13. 50.
    W. Sullivan, Assault on the Unknown (1962 — ch. 7, n. 4), pp. 60–2.Google Scholar
  14. 51.
    RAND Corporation, H. Kallmann-Bijl and W. W. Kellogg, Scientific Use of an Artificial Earth Satellite ( Santa Monica: RAND, 1955 ), P. 5.Google Scholar
  15. 62.
    From remarks made in Moscow by ICIC member Kirill Stanyukovitch on 5 October 1957: K. W. Gatland (ed. ), Project Satellite (London: Allan Wingate, 1958), p. 102. Blagonravov also stated that Sputnik 1 was not an IGY satellite: New York Times, 7 October 1957.Google Scholar
  16. US Congress, House, Astronautics, Space Exploration (n. 12), pp. 824, 70. S. N. Vemov, P. V. Vakulov, E. V. Gorchakov, Yu. I. Logachev and A. Ye. Chudakov, ‘Study of Soft Component of Cosmic Rays beyond the Limits of the Atmosphere’, Annals, vol. XII pt II (1961), p. 667.Google Scholar
  17. 73.
    J. W. Dungey, ‘The Radiation Belts’ in D. R. Bates, The Planet Earth 2nd edn ( Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1964 ), p. 311.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 74.
    S. N. Vemov, N. L. Grigorov, Yu. I. Logachev and A. Ye. Chudakov, ‘Measurement of cosmic radiation by rockets and artificial earth satellites’, Annals, vol. XII pt II (1961), p. 652.Google Scholar
  19. 82.
    For examples of contemporary authors and later historians taking this line see: A. Marshack, The World in Space (1958 — ch. 7, n. 41 ), p. 160Google Scholar
  20. J. M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (1959 — ch. 1, n. 34 ), p. 222Google Scholar
  21. J. T. Wilson, IGY: the Year of the New Moons ( London: Michael Joseph, 1961 ), p. 80Google Scholar
  22. E. N. Hayes, Trackers of the Skies (Cambridge, MA: Howard Doyle, 1968), p. 51; Green and Lomask, Vanguard (n. 10 ), p. 185.Google Scholar
  23. 84.
    H. Brooks, ‘The Scientific Adviser’ in R. M. Gilpin and C. Wright (eds), Scientists and National Policy-Making ( New York: Columbia U. Press, 1964 ), pp. 76–7.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Rip Bulkeley 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rip Bulkeley

There are no affiliations available

Personalised recommendations