Ad Homines — Eisenhower and Johnson Before 1953

  • Rip Bulkeley
Part of the Studies in Military and Strategic History book series (SMSH)


Historians have often commented on the roles played by President Eisenhower and Senator Johnson as the two protagonists in the sputniks crisis of 1957–8, usually to the detriment of the former and the credit of the latter. But none has ever prepared the ground for such a comparison by asking whether each man’s previous career made it likely that he would fail or pass the test of the sputniks by quite so decisive a margin as is usually claimed. The record of the Eisenhower administration on missiles and satellites, prior to Sputnik 1, will be examined below in its proper place, as will Johnson’s handling of the political opportunity with which he was presented in the fall of 1957. This chapter deals only with what is known about the two men’s previous encounters with the technology and its strategic implications.


Space Policy Military Family Iron Curtain Eisenhower Administration Psychological Warfare 
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Notes and References

  1. 1.
    D. D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe ( London: Heinemann, 1948 ), pp. 284–5.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    W. F. Craven and J. L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II vol. 3 (Chicago: Chicago U. Press, 1951 ), pp. 102–3, 527, 879.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    B. Collier, The Battle of the V Weapons 1944–45 ( Morley: Elmfield Press, 1976 ), p. 111.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    T. Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy (London: Michael Joseph, 1987), pp. 3, 134.Google Scholar
  5. 8.
    US Congress, House, Appropriations, Hearings: Military Appropriation for 1947 (1946 — ch. 1, n. 23 ), p. 1117.Google Scholar
  6. 9.
    US Congress, House, Appropriations, Subcommittee on War Department Appropriations, Hearings: Military Establishment Appropriation Bill for 1948 (80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947 ), p. 79.Google Scholar
  7. 12.
    S. E. Ambrose, Eisenhower vol. 1 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984 ), p. 506.Google Scholar
  8. 14.
    H. L. Goodwin, The Science Book of Space Travel ( New York: Franklin Watts, 1954 ), p. 3.Google Scholar
  9. 15.
    B. W. Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower ( Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981 ), pp. 13–15.Google Scholar
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    Ibid., pp. 126–33; J. Hale, Radio Power, Propaganda, and International Broadcasting ( London: Paul Elek, 1975 ).Google Scholar
  11. 20.
    DDEL — Pre-Presidential Papers: Subjects, Box 145, Folder: Hearings, 1951 (1), ‘Testimony to a Joint Executive Session of the Senate Committees on the Armed Services and on Foreign Relations, February 1, 1951’, carbon typescript, pp. 8, 75. Words underlined were omitted from the published version: US Congress, Senate, Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearings: Assignment of Ground Forces of the U. S. to Duty in the European Area (82nd Congress, 1st Session, 1951 ), pp. 10, 28.Google Scholar
  12. 21.
    B. Mooney, The Lyndon Johnson Story ( London: The Bodley Head, 1964 ), pp. 28–30.Google Scholar
  13. 22.
    S. L. Rearden, The Formative Years 1947–1960 part 1 of A. Goldberg (ed. ), History of the Office of Secretary of Defense ( Washington: OSD History Office, 1984 ), pp. 353–6.Google Scholar
  14. 26.
    L. B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963–1969 ( London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1972 ), p. 271.Google Scholar
  15. 27.
    L. B. Johnson, ‘We Are Ahead of Russia — We Can Stay Ahead’, Preview Magazine, December 1950.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Rip Bulkeley 1991

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  • Rip Bulkeley

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