British Strategy in the Middle East in the Wake of the Abyssinian Crisis, 1936–39
The Italian conquest of Abyssinia in 1935–36, precipitated an almost continuous series of crises for British strategists and policymakers in the Middle East. It forced them to reconsider and reformulate strategic plans for the defence of the region, meaning, in effect, Egypt.
KeywordsMiddle East Suez Canal Grand Strategy Egyptian Government British Troop
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