Abstract
This chapter argues the case against reprocessing spent fuel. First, it addresses the arguments put forward by the proponents of reprocessing: that is, the resource justification (recovery of plutonium and uranium for reuse) and the benefits derived from a waste management technique. Second, it looks at the proliferation and terrorist risks associated with reprocessing which arise from the difficulties of applying effective safeguards and physical security measures to the weapons-usable plutonium that is recovered from spent fuel.
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Notes
P. M. S. Jones, Backend of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Strategies and Options, International Symposium (Vienna, IAEA, 1987), p. 235.
R. P. Bush, Backend of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Strategies and Options, International Symposium (Vienna: IAEA, 1987), p. 185.
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© 1992 Frank Barnaby
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Eavis, P. (1992). The Case Against Reprocessing. In: Barnaby, F. (eds) Plutonium and Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11693-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11693-5_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-11695-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-11693-5
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