Basic Income Schemes and the Lessons from Public Economics

  • Anthony B. Atkinson
Part of the International Economic Association Series book series (IEA)

Abstract

What I would like to do in this lecture is to take one major policy issue in the field of social security and taxation — the proposal to introduce a basic income scheme — and use it as a basis for reviewing the current state of public economics. The basic income scheme is a quite radical proposal, affecting both social security and personal income taxation. It brings together consideration of tax reform — one of the leading policy topics of the 1980s — and of social security reform — which I suspect will be one of the key issues of the 1990s. It has generated interest in a number of countries. I have seen proposals for — among other countries — Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Eire, France, Italy, Netherlands, the UK, USA and West Germany.

Keywords

Depression Income Librium Sonal Milton 

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Copyright information

© International Economic Association 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anthony B. Atkinson
    • 1
  1. 1.London School of Economics and Political ScienceUK

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