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Politics Matter After All

Testing Alesina’s Theory of RE Partisan Cycles on Data for Seventeen Countries
  • Martin Paldam
Part of the International Economic Association book series (IEA)

Abstract

The theoretical framework belongs to the family of political business cycles as are briefly surveyed in Table 14.1. We want to analyse (a) and (b). We therefore use the theory of partisan cycles (introduced by Hibbs, 1977) that takes off from the idea that governments have different ideologies, and that cycles are generated because governments change. The link between the different policies, as generated by the different ideologies, and the different outcomes depends crucially on the expectations regime assumed. In the original Hibbs-version of the theory there are no expectations.

Keywords

Public Consumption Rational Expectation American Political Science Review Rational Expectation Government Period 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Economic Association 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martin Paldam
    • 1
  1. 1.Aarhus UniversityAarhusDenmark

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