Abstract
In a paper called ‘Are Moral Considerations Overriding?’, in her published collection,1 Philippa Foot replies to my criticisms2 of her recent writings. She says, ‘It is often said that in practical reasoning moral considerations must be overriding considerations; but I do not myself know of any good defence of this proposition, or even an exposition which makes the thesis clear. In my article ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’ I said that there was nothing in this idea that could be used in defence of the doctrine of the categorical imperative, and that seems to me as true now as it seemed to me then’ (p. 181).
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Notes
Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978).
D. Z. Phillips and H. S. Price, ‘Remorse Without Repudiation’, Analysis, 28 (1967).
A. I. Melden, Rights and Right Conduct (Oxford: Blackwell, 1959).
For further discussion of this failure see Peter Winch, ‘Moral Integrity’, in Ethics and Action (London: Routledge, 1978).
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© 1992 D. Z. Phillips
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Phillips, D.Z. (1992). Do Moral Considerations Override Others?. In: Interventions in Ethics. Swansea Studies in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11539-6_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11539-6_11
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