Soviet Nuclear Doctrine

  • Michael J. Mazarr

Abstract

A debate has raged for many years over the true nature of Soviet thinking on nuclear war. Many influential strategic analysts have argued that Soviet nuclear doctrine is aggressive, guided by the central assumption that the USSR could fight and win a nuclear war. As such it is depicted as the tool of an expansionist, revisionist Marxist-Leninist state whose primary goal is the subversion of the West. Naturally, these analysts contend that Soviet nuclear doctrine constitutes a significant threat to Western security.

Keywords

Europe Radar Assure Expense Hull 

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Notes

  1. 1.
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  43. 84.
    Disinformation No.7 (Autumn 1987), 1. See also Leon Goure’s comments on sections of the doctrine in Strategic Review XV (Autumn 1987), 85, and William Scott, ‘Another Look’, who calls the doctrine ‘one primarily of “pokazuka” (for show)’.Google Scholar
  44. 88.
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Copyright information

© Michael J. Mazarr 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael J. Mazarr
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Strategic and International StudiesUSA

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