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India’s Changing Views of Arms Control

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Abstract

While a country’s adherence to international agreements is usually taken for granted, rejection of a treaty is more likely to attract attention. The fact that India, or Pakistan for that matter, refused to join the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) is highlighted, but their support for disarmament in general, and their adherence to some arms control measures, is ignored. It is probably true that the NPT remains the most important means with which a country’s attitude towards nuclear proliferation can be measured. The NPT is also unique in the sense that it addresses both NWS as well as NNWS, and it is equally a treaty among the latter countries. But it is not sufficient to judge a country’s commitment to non-proliferation only by its commitment to the NPT or vice versa. In practice, many countries have behaved as ‘de facto’ signatories without becoming a party to the NPT. India has so far behaved as such by not committing itself to a nuclear weapons programme. Instead, India remains committed to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and has expressed support for arms control and disarmament measures on a great many occasions.

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Notes

  1. The text in G. H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London: Faber & Faber, 1966), pp. 412–14.

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  2. For an interesting account see A. Myradal (of the Swedish delegation to the UN), The Game of Disarmament: How the US and Russia Run the Arms Race (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), pp. 87–90.

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  3. See for example N. M. Ghatate, Disarmament in India’s Foreign Policy, 1947–65 (Washington DC: American University, 1966).

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  4. U.S Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1965 ( Washington DC: Government Printing Office Series, p. 147. Hereafter referred to as ACDA, Document, 1965, Charkavarty, 4 May 1965.

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  5. ACDA, Documents 1966, statement by C. H. Trivedi, 15 February 1966, p. 17.

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  6. ACDA, Documents 1965, Charkavarty, 4 May 1965, p. 143.

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  7. ACDA, Documents 1966, Trivedi, 14 May 1965, p. 170.

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  8. ACDA, Documents 1974, Statement by the Indian representative, Singh, to the First Committee of the General Assembly, 15 November 1974, p. 645.

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  9. ACDA, Documents 1974, Statement by the Indian representative, Mishra, First Committee of the General Assembly, 20 November 1974, p. 687.

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  10. For a review of this see C. S. Fleming, The UN Declaration of the Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace: the Third World Versus the Superpowers (New York University, Ph.D. thesis, 1984).

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© 1991 Ziba Moshaver

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Moshaver, Z. (1991). India’s Changing Views of Arms Control. In: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the Indian Subcontinent. St Antony’s. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11471-9_6

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