The Parties, the Environment and Bargaining Power

  • Jacques Rojot

Abstract

This chapter is devoted to building upon the elements outlined in Chapter 1. In other words, it draws the practical conclusions to be inferred from the prevalence of conflictual situations and from bounded rationality as they are seen to apply to a negotiating situation.

Keywords

Transportation Marketing Stake Concession Monopoly 

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Notes and References

  1. 1.
    See Leonard Sayles, Behavior of Industrial Work Groups (New York: Wiley, 1958), as well as the discussion of his results in Crozier and Friedberg, L’Acteur et le Système, pp. 43–5.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    The Social Psychology of Bargaining pp. 130–2.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    This process, called intra-organisational bargaining, has been put in evidence by Walton and McKersie in a 1965 book which has developed as the source and inspiration for much further analysis of collective bargaining and remains extremely influential. See R. E. Walton and R. B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965). Particularly noteworthy among subsequent efforts is the work of Peterson and Tracy who attempt to enlarge the framework proposed by Walton and McKersie and to test it empirically.Google Scholar
  4. See R. B. Peterson and C. Tracy, Testing a Behavioral Theory model of Labor negotiations’, Industrial Relations, vol. 16, no. 1, February 1977.Google Scholar
  5. 4.
    A different grid, but with a similar goal, has been presented by Adam et Reynaud, Conflits du Travail et Changement Social.Google Scholar
  6. 5.
    See C. G. M. Atkinson, The Effective Negotiator (London: Billings & Sons, 1980).Google Scholar
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    See Section III of Chapter 2.Google Scholar
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    The example is borrowed from Crozier and Friedberg, L’Acteur et le Système p. 61 and expanded upon.Google Scholar
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    The notion of raising the stakes and the relevant strategies are very aptly defined and described by Adam and Reynaud, Conflits du Travail et Changement Social, under the name of’ sliding Games’, pp. 179ff.Google Scholar
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    See Pfeffer, Power in Organizations, p. 2.Google Scholar
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    On the transmission of bargaining power from a given situation see J. Rojot, International Collective Bargaining (Deventer: Kluwer, 1978).Google Scholar
  21. 19.
    The idea of this table to support our contention of subjectivity of bargaining power is inspired by a different example used in R. Fisher and N. Ury, Getting to Yes (London: Hutchinson, 1983) pp. 24–25.Google Scholar
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    L. Tracy and R. B. Peterson, ‘Differences in reactions of union and management negotiators to the problem solving process’, Industrial Relations Journal, vol. 8, no. 4, winter 1977.Google Scholar
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    See the discussion above and the application by Warr, Psychology and Collective Bargaining, of basic psychological elements to collective bargaining.Google Scholar
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  32. 30.
    Certain definitions of negotiation by certain theorists even exclude that case. See the developments on a definition of negotiation in Chapter 1.Google Scholar
  33. 31.
    These ideas have been put in evidence by Bacharach and Lawler, Bargaining.Google Scholar
  34. 32.
    Crozier and Friedberg, L’Acteur et le Système.Google Scholar
  35. 33.
    Those aspects of a negotiating relationship were put in evidence by Jan Pen, see J. Pen, The Wage Rate under Collective Bargaining (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Jacques Rojot 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jacques Rojot
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Paris I - SorbonneFrance

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