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The Scissors Phenomenon: The Incongruity of East—West Nuclear Doctrines

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Soviet Foreign Policy
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Abstract

Arms races have been ascribed many causes or propellants, from ideological dogma and blind quest for superiority, to the manipulative dynamics of ‘the military— industrial—bureaucratic—research complex’, to the distrust that sees arms control verification as synonymous with military—industrial espionage.

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Notes

  1. The Soviet definition of doctrine, which defines military—technical doctrine as a derivative of underlying socioeconomic or political doctrine is both more rigorous and more encompassing than the US approach — which tends to focus on the narrower military dimension. In the USA the wider definition (which accords also with Sun Tsuian and Clausewitzian precepts) is sometimes thought of as the nation’s military or military—political ‘posture’. See ‘Military Doctrine’, Voyennyi entsiklopedicheskii slova?’, Voenizdat, Moscow, 2nd edn, 1986, p. 240; and R. Garthoff, ‘New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine’, Washington Quarterl?, Summer 1988, pp. 131–58.

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  2. C. G. Jacobsen, ‘Soviet strategy: The Naval Dimension’, in The Uncertain Course: New Weapons, Strategies and Mindset?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, pp. 187–97.

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  3. Early nuclear-war-fighting concepts should not be confused with surgical strike and counter-force targeting doctrines associated with later-generational (theoretical) missile accuracy and reliability projections.

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  4. Statement of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy Director of Naval Intelligence before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, 1 March 1988.

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© 1989 Carl G. Jacobsen

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Jacobsen, C.G. (1989). The Scissors Phenomenon: The Incongruity of East—West Nuclear Doctrines. In: Jacobsen, C.G. (eds) Soviet Foreign Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11341-5_4

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