Abstract
Like an overfall in the tide, caused by an upsurge striking a rough configuration in the ocean bed, the years 1955–57 created powerful eddies of disruption, but did not alter the underlying currents in government. The history of the next four years could be written in terms of Conservative success in survival, particularly in the unprecedented feat of winning the third election in a row in 1959. But the field of industrial, labour and financial politics began to be dominated by the dissatisfaction of institutions, themselves concerned about worries, and even anger among their members. Meanwhile, inside government and its departments, the antitheses between growth and the balance of payments, between employment and price equilibrium were not synthesised, and instead an attempt occurred, in 1961, to break out of the cycle in what looked like novel ways.1
Because of the thirty year rule, prohibiting access to state archives after 1954, it becomes progressively harder to write about policy evolution and thinking inside the Treasury, BOT and MOL. Up to 1955–56, existing trends can be followed; but the next two years were sufficiently disruptive to prevent this for 1957–61.I have relied increasingly, therefore, on interview material, on the institutions’ records of transactions with departments and after 1962 on departmental papers to and discussions inside NEDC.
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Notes and References
CRD file, Policy Study Group, 1957, quoted in Ramsden, Conservative Policy p. 213.
A conclusion not substantiated by Butler and Rose in their study of the 1959 election, who pointed instead to the behaviour of the non-aligned centre which, they believed, thought it did not matter which party was in power, during the previous eighteen months (The British General Election of 1959, pp. 199–200).
As S. Brittan pointed out in The Treasury under the Tories (1964), p. 122, the Treasury developed the practice of publishing figures of the reserves at the lowest possible level, to induce caution in their political masters.
Civil atomic energy provides another instance: for Britain continued to suffer from the closed circuit of policy-making described in an earlier period by Margaret Gowing and Duncan Burn, so that it reached a condition of almost unique inefficiency by 1961 — a poor basis for the ambitious programme of advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs) in 1965 (cf. Roger Williams, Nuclear Power Decisions 1953–78 (1980)).
Maudling, for example, seems to have known very little of the French system before 1961 (R. K. Middlemas, Industry, Unions and Government (1983), pp. 11–12).
Monckton papers 29, Macleod-Monckton correspondence, October 1957–November 1958; see also Nigel Fisher, Iain Macleod (1973), p. 111.
cf. S. J. Prais, The Evolution of the Giant Firm in Britain (1981).
It failed but was left with a 20 per cent holding (Donald Coleman, History of Courtaulds, vol. 3 (1980)).
Similar processes were at work in the car industry, most obviously in the BMC-Leyland merger in 1968 (K. Williams et al., Why Are the British Bad at Manufacturing? (1984), pp. 217–39).
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© 1986 Keith Middlemas
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Middlemas, K. (1986). Threats to Equilibrium 1957–61. In: Power, Competition and the State. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10956-2_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10956-2_10
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