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Experimental Nuclear Explosions and the Arms Race

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New Technologies and the Arms Race

Part of the book series: Studies in Disarmament and Conflicts ((SDC))

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Abstract

It is highly significant that, ever since the first few years of experimental explosions of thermonuclear devices, the three nuclear powers of the time (the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union) have grappled with the problem of suspending their nuclear tests. This awareness of the importance that the discontinuance of programmes to develop military nuclear technology could have for international security and peace led, in the summer of 1958, to the convocation of a conference of experts of the Eastern and Western countries to tackle the technical questions linked with the detection of experimental nuclear explosions. The conclusions of those discussions were that it would be possible to detect and identify nuclear explosions in the atmosphere above the power of 1 kiloton (kt; 1 kt = 1000 tons of TNT), and to detect, with a reliability of approximately 90 per cent, underground nuclear tests of more than 5 kt. The monitoring network necessary for this purpose would have required a system of around 160 to 170 control stations installed on the ground and about ten appropriately-equipped ships.

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Notes

  1. L. R. Sykes and D. M. Davis, ‘The Yields of Soviet Strategic Weapons’, Scientific American (April 1987) pp. 21–9; and A. Krass, ‘Recent Developments in Arms Control Verification Technology’, in Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1987 (Oxford, 1987) pp. 431–46.

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  2. H. F. York, ‘U.S.-Soviet Negotiations and the Arms Race’, in W. F. Hanreider (ed.), Technology, Strategy and Arms Control (Boulder, Colorado, 1985) pp. 1–14.

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  3. J. F. Evernden, C. B. Archambeau and E. Cranswick, ‘An Evaluation of Seismic Decoupling and Underground Nuclear Test Monitoring Using High Frequency Seismic Data’, Review of Geophysics, vol. xxiv (1986) pp. 143–215.

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  4. J. A. Stein, ‘Nuclear Tests Mean New Weapons’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1986) pp. 8–11.

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  5. T. B. Taylor, ‘Third-Generation Nuclear Weapons’, Scientific American (April 1987) pp. 30–9.

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  6. Ibid.

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  7. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Energy and Technology Review (Washington, DC, 1987).

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  8. H. Bethe, N. Bradbury, R. Garwin, S. M. Keeny Jr, W. Panofsky, G. Rathjens, H. Scoville Jr and P. Warnke, in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (November 1985) p. 11.

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© 1989 Unione Scienzati per il Disarmo Convegno Internazionale

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Lenci, F. (1989). Experimental Nuclear Explosions and the Arms Race. In: Schaerf, C., Reid, B.H., Carlton, D. (eds) New Technologies and the Arms Race. Studies in Disarmament and Conflicts. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10615-8_22

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