Abstract
Desmond Ball has highlighted the physical vulnerability of the Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) systems of NATO, the incompatibility of different service and national communications systems, and the mismatch between the cumbersome decision-making structure of NATO and the requirements for rapid communications and quick decisions.1 In so doing he has made it clear that NATO forces would probably be unable to use nuclear weapons in the European theatre with any semblance of coherence in the event of a large-scale European war. Whether this should be viewed as a truly sad state of affairs depends on one’s view about the role of nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe.
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Notes
Henry A. Kissinger, ‘NATO: The Next Thirty Years’, Survival, vol. xxi (1979) 264.
George Rathjens, ‘Inadvertent Nuclear War and Crisis Management’, Scientia, vol. cxx (1985) 337–41.
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© 1989 Unione Scienzati per il Disarmo Convegno Internazionale
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Rathjens, G.W. (1989). Problems in European Command and Control. In: Schaerf, C., Reid, B.H., Carlton, D. (eds) New Technologies and the Arms Race. Studies in Disarmament and Conflicts. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10615-8_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10615-8_16
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