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Civilian Nuclear Technologies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation

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New Technologies and the Arms Race

Part of the book series: Studies in Disarmament and Conflicts ((SDC))

Abstract

Links between civilian nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons proliferation should be viewed in the larger context of the interactions of three sets of issues: nuclear-energy options and choices; the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to additional nations (and perhaps sub-national groups); and the status of major-power nuclear armaments and arms control. Each of these sets of issues influences the others and is influenced by them.

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Notes

  1. See, for example, George Quester, The Politics of Proliferation (Baltimore, Maryland, 1973); Ted Greenwood, Harold A. Feiveson, and Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities, and Strategies for Control (New York, 1977); Willam C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (Boston, Massachusetts, 1982); and Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago, 1984).

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  2. William Epstein, The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (New York, 1976).

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  3. John P. Holdren, ‘Extended Deterrence, No-First-Use, and European Security’, Scientia, vol. cxx (1985) 191–201.

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  4. Lawrence Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order (Baltimore, Maryland, 1987).

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  5. Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), US Congress, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards (Washington, DC, 1977).

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  6. Ibid.

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  7. Office of Nuclear Energy, US Department of Energy, Nuclear Energy Cost Data Base (Washington, DC, 1985).

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  8. The implicit price deflator for the US Gross National Product between 1975 and 1985, as calculated by the Department of Commerce, is 1·88. US Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, DC, 1987).

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  9. The situation in which acquisition of nuclear-energy capabilities inevitably brings a weapons capability closer. whether that result is initially desired by the possible proliferator or not, was termed ‘latent proliferation’ in an early, astute analysis; see H. A. Feiveson, ‘Latent Proliferation: The International Security Implications of Civilian Nuclear Power’ (PhD Thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs, Princeton University, 1972). See also works cited in note 1; and J. P. Holdren, ‘Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Connection is Dangerous’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January 1983).

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  10. See, for example, Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987).

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  11. See, for example, Bernard Spinrad, ‘Nuclear Power and Nuclear Weapons: The Connection is Tenuous’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February 1983); and Alexander de Volpi, ‘Technological Misinformation: Fission and Fusion Weapons’, in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds), The Arms Race in the 1980s (London, 1982).

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  12. Lawrence Scheinman, Atomic Energy in the Fourth Republic (Princeton, New Jersey, 1965).

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  13. See Spector, Going Nuclear; and Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today (New York, 1984).

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  14. Ibid.

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  15. See, especially, International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), Summary Volume (International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1980); and Harold A. Feiveson, Frank von Hippel, and Robert H. Williams, ‘An Evolutionary Strategy for Nuclear Power’, in David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf (eds), The Hazards of the International Energy Crisis (London, 1982).

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  16. For detailed discussions of internationalisation from many perspectives, see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Internationalization to Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (London, 1980).

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  17. B. Keisch, C. Auerbach, A. Fainberg, S. Fiarmen, L. G. Fishbone, W. A. Higinbotham, J. R. Lemley, and J. O’Brien, Long-term Proliferation and Safeguards Issues in Future Technologies (Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1986).

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  18. T. B. Cochran, W. M. Arkin, R. S. Norris, and M. M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. II: U.S. Nuclear Warhead Production (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987).

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  19. See especially B. Amory and L. Hunter Lovins, Energy/War: Breaking the Nuclear Link (New York, 1982).

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  20. Frank von Hippel, David H. Albright, and Barbara G. Levi, ‘Stopping the Production of Fissile Materials for Weapons’, Scientific American, vol. 253, no. 3 (1985) 41.

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© 1989 Unione Scienzati per il Disarmo Convegno Internazionale

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Holdren, J.P. (1989). Civilian Nuclear Technologies and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation. In: Schaerf, C., Reid, B.H., Carlton, D. (eds) New Technologies and the Arms Race. Studies in Disarmament and Conflicts. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10615-8_10

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