A Solution too Early: The First Bernadotte Plan and its Consequences
With the establishment of the truce and a supervision apparatus, Bernadotte was able to turn his mind to the next step. Typically, he aspired to nothing less than a complete political settlement to be reached within the remaining time of his mandate. His secretary recorded that he spoke of ‘making the truce permanent, producing proposals for a solution and taking them to the UN Assembly, just as UNSCOP did a year earlier’. Using a platitude, he said he hoped for ‘peace by Christmas’.1 His deficient knowledge of Palestine did not worry him too much. He expected his experts to supply him with ideas and trusted his own judgement to pick out the good ones. Indeed, his team was not only knowledgeable but capable of collective thinking. It was this combination which produced a partition scheme, known as ‘the Bernadotte plan’.
KeywordsSecurity Council Arab State Jewish Immigration Jewish State Arab League
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