Multilateral Coordination of Out-of-Area Activities

  • Geoffrey Edwards


Ringing declarations and exhortations to consult closely and to develop more harmonious if not harmonised positions have regularly emerged from the multilateral fora of Western Europe and the Atlantic. In 1951, for example, it was declared that:

There is a continuing need ... for effective consultation at an early stage on current problems, in order that national policies may be developed and action taken on the basis of a full awareness of the activities and interests of all the members of NATO. While all members of NATO have a responsibility to consult with their partners on appropriate matters, a large share of responsibility for such consultation rests on the more powerful members of the community.1


Member State Foreign Policy Middle East Foreign Minister Arab League 
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Copyright information

© Joseph I. Coffey and Gianni Bonvicini 1989

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  • Geoffrey Edwards

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