Political Perceptions and Military Responses to Out-of-Area Challenges

  • Reinhardt Rummel


This chapter looks at resources for defence — not military budgets, soldiers or weapons, but rather the resources of the confidence of the public in the wisdom of their governments’ defence policy, and in the adequacy of the support this implies.


Public Opinion Middle East Military Force European Parliament European Public 
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Copyright information

© Joseph I. Coffey and Gianni Bonvicini 1989

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  • Reinhardt Rummel

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