Solidarity as Scapegoat

Abstract

The Soviet leadership had been greatly successful in accomplishing the consolidation of the PUWP in a form entirely acceptable to itself, if not ideal from an ideological standpoint. While the Polish government was not under the control of the recidivist Muscovites, nonetheless it was safely in the hands of the largely manipulable ‘centre’, having been thoroughly purged of any ‘rightist’ (from Moscow’s standpoint) elements which largely shared the aspirations represented by Solidarity, and which would seek a reconciliation with the free Polish union based on a reform of the entire Polish social contract. Now that the Kremlin had secured the rear flank of the PUWP, it kept closed the option of reform and compromise with Solidarity by making clear in increasingly firm and even antagonistic terms the unacceptability of the Polish union as a partner in power within Poland, making it the scapegoat for all of Poland’s problems. The Soviet leaders meanwhile sought to mould the PUWP into an instrument with which they could bring the crisis in Poland to a close, one which would maintain as firmly as before their position of hegemony in that country and their control over its affairs.