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Abstract

The third phase of the Polish crisis, which saw an intensification of pressure by the Soviet Union versus Poland in the form of large military manoeuvres, involved efforts by the Soviet leadership to aggravate tensions in Poland to head off or unravel compromises and force confrontation between the PUWP and Solidarity. Thus, Moscow sought to drive a wedge between the two forces within Poland capable of initiating reform and a new social contract. This was done in order to maintain the PUWP’s power, to polarise the situation, and to close all options save confrontation. Thus, the political ascendancy of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Minister of National Defence and Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, may be seen in the context of strengthening the PUWP — and foreshadowed further moves in this direction — while the first letter sent by the CPSU to the PUWP Politburo at the climax of this phase further bolstered the USSR’s position by forestalling the purge of the most hard-line pro-Soviet members of the PUWP Politburo.

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3 Divide and Conquer

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© 1988 Thomas M. Cynkin

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Cynkin, T.M. (1988). Divide and Conquer. In: Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09694-7_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09694-7_3

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-09696-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-349-09694-7

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