An Emerging Opposition? Agricultural Interests and Federal Research Policy

Abstract

Studies that link agricultural policy and interest group politics generally focus on the supportive aspects of lobbying. Observers as diverse in viewpoint and background as Theodore Lowi (1979) and Charles Hardin (1978) contend that agricultural insiders from Congress, administrative bureaus, and interest groups set policy by bringing an agreed-upon consensus to centralized points of decision-making. Within the agricultural establishment, highly centralized clusters or networks of participants are seen as developing their own agreements in a fragmented and decentralized political universe (Meyer and Dishman, undated). The key elements that are seen to be maintaining these well-ordered arrangements include the ability of all participants to compromise within their own decisional networks, reciprocity between networks, and trust in the judgements of policymaking colleagues. In short, governing networks work because no one destroys the legitimacy and expertise of the principal players.