Abstract
If a credible analysis of the significance of the sea and of maritime forces in Soviet strategy must begin in the realms of her internal political structure and foreign policy, it must continue with an examination of Russia’s overall strategy and an acceptance that hitherto it has been predominantly land-based. Geography, history, as well as perceptions of contemporary threats, all point to this conclusion. It is true that Soviet strategic writing sometimes admits that the advent of nuclear weapons has transformed the nature of war and that the Strategic Rocket Forces have now displaced the Ground Forces as the chief determinants of victory, but the basic concepts are still land-orientated. The main stress has been on general nuclear war, beginning with heavy nuclear strikes against the enemy’s armed forces and economic centres, and immediately followed up and exploited by highly mobile mass armies and their associated air power. On the defensive side, the Soviet homeland must be protected by the Air Defence Forces and damage further limited by extensive civil defence measures covering the population and essential industries.1 In the light of this emphasis, if maritime forces are to have a significant role in Soviet strategy and gain an adequate share of resources, their advocates must convince the political leadership that they have a unique contribution, which cannot be made by land forces, to the central aims of strategic planning; the prevention of nuclear or conventional attack on Soviet territory, or, if deterrence fails, the country’s ability to fight and win a general war.
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Notes and References
Accounts of the development of Soviet strategy will be found in Scott and Scott (1979) and Baylis and Segal (1981).
The role of the armed forces in Russia’s history is authoritatively treated in G. H. N. Seton Watson (1977) ‘Russia: Army and Autocracy’ in M. E. Howard (ed.) Soldiers and Governments (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode); Erickson (1962); and Mackintosh (1967).
Scott and Scott (1979) chapter 4.
Sokolovskiy (1968). The introduction gives the background to the book’s publication.
Ibid., pp. 11–13.
Ibid., pp. 60, 81–109.
Ibid., pp. 134–6.
Ibid., pp. 146, 160–2.
Ibid., pp. 182–200.
Ibid., p. 203.
Ibid., pp. 254–5.
Ibid., pp. 280–7.
Ibid., pp. 299–300.
Ibid., pp. 300–3.
Grechko (1974).
Ibid., editorial introduction.
Ibid., p. 24.
Ibid., chapter 2.
Ibid., p. 82.
Ibid., pp. 151–3.
Ibid., pp. 154–6.
Ibid., p. 284.
MccGwire (1987) traces the downgrading of nuclear war back to the 1960s; Fitzgerald (1986) analyses Ogarkov’s writings; Herspring (1986) discusses Akhromeyev’s contribution.
Gorshkov (1974). See biographical essay in this by J. G. Hibbits, ‘Gorshkov: Architect of the Soviet Navy’ pp. 142–6; MccGwire (1987), Appendix C.
Gorshkov (1974) pp. 1–8.
Ibid., pp. 11–21.
Ibid., pp. 66–73.
Ibid., pp. 89–96.
Ibid., pp. 123–34, 135.
Gorshkov (1979); MccGwire (1987), Appendix C.
MccGwire (1980c) pp. 3–6.
Gorshkov (1979) pp. ix–xii.
Ibid., pp. 9–16.
Young and Sebek (1978) pp. 256–7.
Gorshkov (1979) pp. 156–8.
Ibid., pp. 178–84.
MccGwire (1980c) pp. 3–6.
Gorshkov (1979) p. 213.
Ibid., pp. 213–22.
Ibid., pp. 229–34.
Ibid., pp. 274–7.
Ibid., pp. 234–45.
Ibid., pp. 278–82.
MccGwire (1980c) pp. 3–6.
An official English language translation of the second edition had been made in the United States. The Morskoi Sbornik articles are discussed in Till (1983) and Suggs (1983).
The best readily available treatment in Chernavin is in Wolstenholme et al. (1986) to which we are greatly indebted. See also Jane’s Defence Weekly, 18 January 1986.
What follows is derived from McConnell (1980), a work based on a most probing analysis of the relevant Soviet strategic literature.
Ibid., pp. 24–34.
Ibid., pp. 42–67.
Ibid., pp. 67–88.
MccGwire (1987). The argument is summarised in pp. 335–77.
McConnell (1980), p. 40, quoting an article on ‘The Armed Forces and Military Art of the Main Capitalist States after World War II’ in Voennaya istoriya, Moscow 1971.
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© 1989 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till
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Ranft, B., Till, G. (1989). The Strategic Background. In: The Sea in Soviet Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09464-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09464-6_4
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