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The Radicalisation of Functional Socialism 1968–80

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Democratic Socialism in Britain and Sweden
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Abstract

By the late sixties the relative calm in relations between workers and employers in Sweden was breaking down. Relative deprivation was increasing, less as a consequence of stagnation in incomes and rising unemployment, but more as a consequence of the very policies that the unions had themselves pursued which had entailed very high rates of mobility and consequent disruption to patterns of life. By the mid-seventies this sense of disillusionment and relative deprivation was intensified when the Swedish economy began to go into recession. Commitment to full employment delayed the impact of the world recession for some time but ultimately real incomes began to fall and the more so as a result of the commitment to full employment.

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Notes and References

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  18. The fact that the white-collar union federation, TCO, had also called for greater industrial democracy and were in broad agreement with LO on the issue made it a particularly powerful demand which the Social Democrats could not ignore.

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  29. Childs (1980), p. 57. For the historical background to the idea of wage-earner funds see Eidem and Öhman (n.d.). This is a translation of the first section of a ‘study report’ of the Commission on Wage-Earners’ Funds and Capital Formation, entitled Löntagarfonder: Bakgrund, Problem och Möjligheter. See also Meidner (1978b). This is a translation of the essential part of the revised report adopted by the LO Congress in 1976, Kollektiv Kapitalbildning Genom Löntagarfonder.

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  33. The original report of 1975 was entitled Löntagarfonder.

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  43. that LO adopted his ideas in 1976 so enthusiastically demonstrates the radical tendencies that had emerged within the union movement by this time.

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  51. For a discussion the various views see Stephens (1981b); Elder (1979). The latter believes that rather than votes being lost due to the radicalisation of policy, a secular decline was not held in check mainly because of rising inflation rates.

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  52. Petersson (1978). Korpi challenges the argument that embourgeoisement has produced a long-term decline in support for the Social Democrats pointing out that this was at its highest in the affluent sixties. Korpi (1978a).

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  53. A survey carried out by the conservative paper Svenska Dagblad showed that two thirds of voters were against the funds and one half of LO members were against them. Kelman (1977)

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  60. For a criticism of this type see Meyerson (1979).

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  61. Einhorn and Logue (1980). Wage restraint has, in Denmark, been stated as the price that the unions would have to pay to get the funds. This element has not been absent from the argument in Sweden as Einhorn and Logue report. See also Öhman (1982), pp. 221–29.

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  65. The secretary of the official commision at the time, Berndt Öhman has since said that he was forbidden to write or comment on the issue of power and control by the Chairman, Hjalmar Mehr and members of the government, before the official report was issued. Interview Stockholm, September, 1982.

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© 1989 Malcolm B. Hamilton

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Hamilton, M.B. (1989). The Radicalisation of Functional Socialism 1968–80. In: Democratic Socialism in Britain and Sweden. University of Reading European and International Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09234-5_10

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