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Abstract

At the heart of the problem is the dilemma that, if you wish to deter war by the fear that nuclear weapons will be used, you have to appear to be prepared to use them. But if you do so, and the enemy answers back, you are very much worse off than if you had not done so, if indeed you can be said to be there at all.

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Notes

  1. Neil Kinnock, speech to Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge, Mass., 2 December 1986.

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© 1988 P. Terrence Hopmann and Frank Barnaby

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Gapes, M. (1988). Labour’s Defence and Security Policy. In: Hopmann, P.T., Barnaby, F. (eds) Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-09181-2_22

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