Appeasement, Fiscal Policy and Rearmament

  • G. A. H. Gordon
Part of the Studies in Military and Strategic History book series (SMSH)

Abstract

The Government’s approach to rearmament, denounced in retrospect by those who wish to identify with the aura of omniscience surrounding Churchill, was an integral part of a network of intermeshing policies of which finance, defence- procurement and foreign affairs were all major parts. This fabric has been little understood either then or since, the policy of appeasement particularly being remembered and vilified in isolation.1

Keywords

Depression Europe Income Shrinkage Expense 

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Notes and References

  1. 1.
    A. J. P. Taylor’s Origins of the Second World War (1961) stands out as a remarkably clear-thinking and (at the time) courageous analysis.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© G. A. H. Gordon 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • G. A. H. Gordon

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