This pronouncement by Henry Kissinger, made in the 1950s about American strategic nuclear policy, is still applicable to NATO policymaking today. A cynic may describe the strategy of flexible response as a potpourri of ideas and notions, which often have nothing to do with each other. Flexible response, intended to keep the opponent in the dark, also keeps people in the West guessing about the execution of a strategy, designed for ‘whenever the moment arrives’. Critics of NATO strategy point out, that the way the West ‘prepares for war’ lacks both consistency and credibility. As a result of such criticism, various attempts have been made to provide the West with an alternative.
KeywordsNuclear Weapon Flexible Response Military Organisation Emerge Technology Deterrence Strategy
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