France

Abstract

In 1983 former French Defence Minister Charles Hernu introduced the government’s five-year defence programme (Loi de Programmation) for 1984–8 with a survey of the fundamental elements of French defence.¹ In his presentation, Hernu discussed the requirements of French security by reference to the well-known ‘three circles’ analogy, according to which France must be able to respond to threats to the first circle (the French national sanctuary), the second circle (Western Europe) and the third circle (French overseas territories and interests).² In fact, the three circles analogy is one of the most hardy perennials in French foreign and security debates since the time of the empire because it provides a convenient shorthand for discussing competing French national interests and for establishing priorities. The three circles analogy also makes sense in terms of France’s geostrategic and historical circumstances, since France is both a continental European actor which has contiguous borders with six other European nations, and an important maritime state which faces on to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Because of its status as a continental actor, France has traditionally pursued a ‘forward’ strategy of actively involving itself in major issues of European diplomacy.³