The Idea of Rights (iii)

Abstract

8.1.1 Human rights must necessarily be universal moral rights. But there can be such rights only if there is a universal morality which is their source (see Introduction). We saw in Chapter 5 that there are rational grounds for the universal applicability of common morality. They lie in Kant’s humanity principle together with the practical-reason principle (see 5.2.2–3 above). These yield a universal minimum moral standard which on its negative side requires that no human being should ever be treated merely as a means; on its positive side, that in all their dealings, all human beings must always observe the principles of common morality. Hence we have in common morality a morality which is universal, not only in the sense of being part of the actual morality of every community, but in the sense of being applicable to all human beings irrespective of who they are and what communities and associations they belong to. As the principles of community life as such, the principles of common morality are neutral about moral diversity. They entail no commitment to any particular way of life, any particular morality, any particular institutions, beliefs or values. But we have also seen that their universal applicability modifies this neutrality in an important respect. Any particular morality which requires or merely permits the treatment of any human being merely as a means and thereby violates the universal standard is for that reason morally defective (see 5.2.3 above).