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Abstract

Decolonisation would transform the strategic topography of the world. Newly independent states could turn not only against the West, but also against each other, sparking local conflicts that could expand in wider, and more dangerous, directions. At the same time, the loss of territory to Western control would make it all the more difficult to maintain the military presence which seemed so urgent in view of portentous shifts in global power. Nowhere would such currents of change be so powerful as on the littoral of the Indian Ocean.

Keywords

Indian Ocean Middle East Suez Canal Strategic Formulation Military Presence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes and References

  1. 1.
    Memorandum by Admiral Roy L. Johnson, ‘Long Range Objectives 1968–73’, Command File, Post 1 Jan 46, Serial 0055P93, 5 September 1958.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Memorandum prepared by Long Range Objectives Group, ‘Factors Affecting Changes in the Power Position in Areas Bordering the Southern Oceans (Indian Ocean, South Atlantic)’, PM 5710, Serial 0079P93, 31 May 1960.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Memorandum prepared by Long Range Objectives Group to CNO (Admiral Arleigh Burke), ‘Assuring a Future Base Structure in the African Indian Ocean Area’, PM 5710, Serial 0092P93, 27 June 1960 (quote); memorandum prepared by Long Range Objectives Group, ‘Study of the Feasibility and Cost of Maintaining Continuous Balanced Deployments in the Indian Ocean 1961–1965’, PM 5710 Serial 00125P93, 25 August 1960; see also note 2 above.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    ‘Factors Affecting Changes in Power Position…’ Serial 0079P93, note 2 above (quote); ‘Assuring a Future Base Structure…’, Serial 0092P93, note 3 above.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    ‘Assuring a Future Base Structure…’, Serial 0092P93, note 3 above.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    See note 2 above.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    ‘Study of the Feasibility…’, Serial 00125P93, note 3 above.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    See note 1 above (quote); see also note 2.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    This was the view of Stuart Barber, the top civilian in the Long Range Objectives Group; see also Admiral Miles H. Hubbard to CNO, SPD 1961/5010, Serial 0015P04B, 15 August 1961.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Memorandum by Burke to Op-06 (Deputy CNO, Plans, Policy and Operations), ‘Indian Ocean Fleet’, SPD 1961 Serials, Op-00 Memo 00152–61, 6 March 1961.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Memorandum prepared by Strategic Plans Division analysing JCS document ‘Estimate of the Military Posture Throughout the Free World, FY 1956 Through FY 1959’, SPD, 1954, file A16–12, Serial 00431P30, 17 May 1954; memorandum prepared by Strategic Plans Division, Navy submission for Periodic Report to Secretary of Defense, ‘The Status of U.S. Programs for National Security (as of 30 June 1954)’, SPD, 1954, file A 16–1.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    See note 1 above.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Memorandum prepared by Long Range Objectives Group, ‘Long Range Objectives Through 1973’, Command File Post 1 Jan 46, Serial 0060P93, 9 May 1962.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    ‘Assuring a Future Base Structure…’, Serial 0092P93, note 3 above.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    ‘Study of the Feasibility…’, Serial 00125P93, note 3 above.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    ‘Assuring a Future Base Structure…’, Serial 0092P93.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    CINCUSNAVEUR to Department of the Navy, PM/Indian Ocean 25 February 64 to 30 September 65, Naval Message R 0714462, September 1965.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    These incidents are described in ‘Western Pacific and Indian Ocean Base Study’, Final Report, June 1968, SPD/Series XVII/Miscellaneous Plans and Studies, v. 2, ch. 2. This report was part of a ‘World Wide Base’Google Scholar
  19. Study’ Robert S. McNamara requested in order to force the services to justify both the existing US base structure and the plans they had for future bases.Google Scholar
  20. 19.
    Memorandum prepared by Op-611 (Africa, Middle East, and South Asia Policy Branch), ‘Comments on Political Annex, Westpac Base Study’, PM/Indian Ocean 1 October 65 to —, Op-611/isb, 2 January 1968.Google Scholar
  21. 20.
    Memorandum prepared by Op-61 (Politico-Military Policy Branch), ‘Establishment of a Minimum Fleet Support Facility on Diego Garcia’, PM/Indian Ocean 1 October 65 to —, Op-61F8/gsh, February 1966.Google Scholar
  22. 21.
    See note 18 above.Google Scholar
  23. 22.
    See note 19 above.Google Scholar
  24. 23.
    ‘Western Pacific and Indian Ocean Base Study’, v. 2, app. B and v. 3, ch. 1 (quote). See note 18 above.Google Scholar
  25. 24.

Copyright information

© William Stivers 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • William Stivers
    • 1
  1. 1.University of Southern CaliforniaFrankfurtGermany

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