Conclusion

Abstract

Kant’s attack on the whole notion of speculative metaphysics meant that for him a ‘natural’ or rational theology could no longer be sustained. ‘I maintain’, he wrote in the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘that all attempts to make a purely speculative use of reason in reference to theology are essentially fruitless and of their inner nature null and void; that the principles of its employment in the study of nature do not lead to any theology whatever; consequently that there can be no theology of reason at all unless one takes moral laws as its basis, or uses them as a clue.’¹ Theology, that is, could no longer present itself as a ‘factual’ science, providing knowledge of the supraphenomenal order. This, however, was not a mere confession of scepticism. As we have said, not only did Kant believe in God, he believed also that God’s existence could be affirmed as a matter of reasoned faith. But divine being could not be demonstrated in the way that entities within the phenomenal world may be shown to exist, nor could it be proved from the bare concept of God itself. The difficulty that confronted him therefore was to explain what, in these circumstances, the idea of God could mean. The theologian uses language about God that purports to have determinate significance, and indeed as a rule such language is quite explicit.